

2A
Doc. 3150-~~1~~

Q 3754A

昭和六年七月十六日
於 原田氏邸

陸軍及縮會議と西園寺公

第三回「どうの取巻」

十三日の復新聞記者は自分の如く来て侍従武官
長は亦六郎團長の某本^中中將である云
ふことを耳にしに、其処で某本中將は自命も
絶意にして居る人だからと之は平沼田の非
常なる崇拜者で所謂國本社^の頭等な名士
である。で斯の如き人の側近に奉侍するに
或る見方は依れば重大なことでありて非常な
危険を感ずる。

昭和六年九月十四日

陸軍々編ト西園寺公

第十回ヨリノ抜萃

「夫カラ参謀次長ノ話ニ依ルトヨク平沼男ノ處
ニハ屢々話シニ行クラシク、平沼男ノ日露國交處
ガナカナカ強イ、又所謂政黨政治ニ對スル男ノ非
難モヨク解カサレテ居ルラシイ、何レニシテモ固
本社ト軍部ノ關係ハ相當ニ深イモノラシク自分ハ
感シタ。」

X20e 3150-10B

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 10 - (page 61)

14 September 1931

* * * *

According to what /NINOMIYA/, Vice-Chief of the General Staff said, I received the impression that he was a frequent visitor to Baron HIRANUMA: Baron HIRANUMA seems to be a firm advocate of severing diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. Moreover, it seems that he /NINOMIYA/ has been well indoctrinated with Baron HIRANUMA's condemnation of political parties. I felt that this indicated that the relationship between the Army and Kokuhon-sha /T.N. ultra-nationalistic organization, headed by Baron HIRANUMA, banned by 4 Jan 1946 SCAP directive/ was very intimate.

* * * *

I.P.S. Doc No 3150-14A

Exhibit No.

昭和二十一年十月十一日

園田外務大臣日記

第十四回「よりの抜萃」

夫から十月一日の閣議で幣原外務大臣はシエネに開かれ十四日の理事會まで何とかが一時的に態度を示して置きたい。で天まで日本が撤兵して居れば問題はない。で自衛権の爲になら好いけれども天まで或は吾杯に兵を残し史家に兵を残したりして置くことは面白くないと云ふことと外務大臣は説いたけれども陸軍大臣は「今撤兵すれば非常に困難な立場になり奉天、吾杯との脅へが利がなくなると一俵國際聯盟なんかと云ふものから日本が脱退するがよいじゃないか」と云ふ脱退論と陸軍大臣はふした。

Doc. No. 3150-14A

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 14 - (page 106)

1 October 1931

In the Cabinet Meeting of the 1st of October, Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA stated that he wanted a clarification of attitude before the opening of the Council meeting in Geneva on the 14th. If Japan withdraws troops by that time, there will be no problem. The Foreign Minister further stated that the stationing of troops for the purpose of self-protection is all right. However, the maintenance of more than necessary troops, and the keeping of troops in Kirin and Tungkia is far from good. However, the War Minister said: "If we withdraw troops now, the situation will be very difficult for us, and we will not be able to maintain control of the situation in Mukden and Kirin. Properly speaking, I believe it better for Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations."

Doc. 3150-31-324B

昭和七年二月廿三日

同

廿四日

陸軍軍縮と西園寺公

第廿一回

第廿二回

もの校萃

夫から自分は高橋大藏大臣に逢ひに行つて種々語をして居ると「軍の威信を恢復する爲に上海に陸兵を出し、スー・ウー之を撃つ。軍の威信を恢復する爲に極端に云へば國家を犠牲にすると云ふやうな結果になつて、どちらが根本にあるか甚だ訝しい議論である」と云ふことを自分は感ずる。陸軍大臣は廿^日廿^日まで退かなければどん／＼敵くと云ふけれども今造の力でうち片付けることが第一出来るか、又際限ない話にやないかと自分は一人で心配して居る。

Doc. No. 3150 - 31-32⁸

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 31-32 (pages 258-9)

17 February 1932

. Then I went to see Finance Minister TAKAHASHI. While we were talking on various subjects, /T.N. he said:/ "In order to recover its prestige, the Army will send troops to Shanghai and attack them. Speaking bluntly, it will lead to such results that the Army is to recover its prestige at the expense of the nation. I think that it is a very dubious argument as to which is the more essential. The War Minister says that if they do not retreat 20 kilometers, he will strike them constantly, but for my part, I feel anxious, as I wonder, in the first place, if we can strike and dispose of them with the strength which we have had so far, and also isn't it just endless talk?"

「昭和七年二月廿三日

同

廿四日

陸軍軍縮ト西園寺公

第廿一回

第廿二回

ヨリノ披露

タカラ自分ノ家へ廿一日ノ晩六時カラ大角海軍大臣ト豊田軍務局長ト外務省ノ白鳥ト谷ヲ呼ンデ十一時頃マデ食卓ヲシ乍ライロシナ話ヲシタ。其時ニ頻リニ白鳥ハ外務大臣ノ無能ナコトラ憤慨シテサウシテ「永井次官ヲ寧ロ外務大臣ニシテ外交園遊リト接觸サシタ方ガ確言ダシ、語學セ好イシ非常ニ好イ」ト云フコトラ云ツテタラ自分ハ「豫テ貴族ハ永井ナシカ秘書官ノヤウナ奴ハシヤウガナイト云ツテ居タジヤナイカ。今ニナツテ永井ガ莫迦ニヨクナツタシダナ。一體ドウ云フ澤ナシダ。」ト云ツテ夫カラマアイロシナ政府部内ノ話ナシカラシテ海軍大臣ニセ聞カセテ谷ナシカセ殆ンド芳澤外務大臣ニハ囑ツテ居ルヤウダツタケレドセ結局「永井ヲ外務大臣ニシテ何トカシタイ。」ト云フ風ナ話ヲシ」

Doc 3140-31-32c

IPS Doc. No. 3150-31-32C

Exh. No. _____

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 31-32 - (page 265)

21 February 1932

".....In view of this, I arranged to have Navy Minister OSUMI, Military Affairs Bureau Chief NAGATA and SHIRATORI and TANI from the Foreign Office come to my house on the night of the 21st at 6 o'clock and while eating we talked on various things until around 11 o'clock. At that time SHIRATORI was frequently annoyed by the inefficiency of the Foreign Minister and said: 'It is better by far to make Vice Minister NAGAI the Foreign Minister and let him contact foreign officials. It would be much surer and besides, being a good linguist, he would be very good.' To which I replied: 'Didn't you say a secretary-like man like NAGAI was of no use. Now you think NAGAI is mighty good. For what reason is this?'

Then various intra-governmental conversation was carried on and the Navy Minister was told that TANI too was having trouble with Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA and finally the talk ended on this note. "Make NAGAI Foreign Minister and get something done."

Exhibit No.

J. R. S. Doc No. 3150-36A

新聞記事原稿記、政事 第三十六回

……と云ふは元々金曜の閣議を、曜日を待越して對滿蒙
政策に就き所謂各省聯合會議(陸海軍外務大藏)の議
題となすもの結論がまだで、其の末に對蒙と金曜
日の閣議に付けた。其時にいろいろの問題に到着し、或は
今度ある新國家は九國條約に反する行為と觀し
小ては面をくなく、免に角長面をば之と承認するこ
は暫く見合す、則ち張學良が對國家に對して反逆者
として之を責めんとする爲に據るは、此の場合には今度の新
國家には軍隊と云ふものはないのであるからどうしても何
とか此の國家を救済する爲には日本の軍が之を攻撃し
なければならぬ、其等の消息は例の奉直戦争の時に
日本軍が滿洲省を維持と云ふ名目の下に之を監視した
場合があるといふと、同様に付くやうな、或はけな
いだらうかと云ふ、小問題でゴタくして、とうとう翌日のエ
曜日を要する閣議を待越した。
可なり陸軍の要求は種々な意味で退けられたけれども
其外で自らは其の日に就て海軍大臣に詳細をいつさう
して具體的にその要求を修正されたりも持つて公論
に回された。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 36 - (pages 286-7)

About 11 March 1932

. . . . The Cabinet Meeting on Friday was carried over until Saturday. The decision on the Manchurian-Mongolian policy which was the topic of the Inter-Ministry Conference (Army, Navy, Foreign Affairs, and Finance) was reached and was placed before the Cabinet meeting on Friday. At this meeting, various problems were encountered. Among them was the soon to be formed "New Nation," problem, if this were to be looked upon as a violation of the Nine Power Pact it would be an unsatisfactory state of affairs, then at least on the surface, its recognition should be postponed for the time being. However, if CHANG Hsueh-Liang acts as an insurgent against the "New Nation" and sends punitive troops, it will not be able to quell the rebellion because the "New Nation" has no army. Therefore, in order somehow to safeguard the "New Nation" the Japanese Army must repel the attack. At the time of the Feng-Chili War /T.N. Civil war between the Feng-Tien Regime and the Chili Regime/ the Japanese Army under the guise of a Manchurian peace preservation force, was on the alert. The problem whether or not we may do the same as in that case raised so much trouble that the Cabinet meeting was carried over to Saturday.

The demands of the Army, to a certain extent, from various standpoints, were repulsed /for the present/. Having obtained the inside story from the Navy Minister, I showed the original and corrected plans to the Prince on Monday.

I. P. S. Doc. No. 3150-39A

3763

4

「西園寺、夏田日記」

第三十九回「なる」の抜粋

夫から其來自命の処に白鳥と陸軍の鈴木と呼
んで近衛と自分で一緒に飯を食つてさうして種々今
朝の話の要旨を會談か。と云ふやうな話や軍部の中
の種々な状況を聞いた。夫で鈴木中佐の話に依れば軍
は何も「平沼」でなければいかぬとか「有藤」でなければ
いかぬとか、ことは先頭ない。要するに今日まで
情実因縁の付まつた既成政黨の連中は總理
になつてももう大抵歳をとつて誰か見てもこれは……
……と思ふやうなもの、此重大な時に大政掌理の位
に當ると云ふことは如何にも軍部のみなならず一般
に面白くない感をも与へる。此際公正で私的な
い何等因縁に扱はれない人物が全く必要であり
さうして夫が又若く明るくあることが「層凡
ての空氣を一新する所以であるから此際は寧ろ
近衛に自自の或は元老の肩代りとも司法に立
つたら好い」と云ふ。で斯う云ふ重大な時期
に元老が先に立つて國政の司法に當ることが最
も好いけれども歳をとつておまはらうと云ふ意味
で、謂ふと云ふ思ふに近衛が云ふやうが、
と云ふと云ふ島も鈴木も「歳が若く居た。」

Exhibit

RETURN TO ROOM 361

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 39 - (pp. 304-5)

4 April 1942

Then, that evening, I called SHIRATORI, and SUZUKI of the Army, to my house to eat with KONOYE and myself. We talked about various matters, such as this morning's talk on whether it should be HIRANUMA or SAITO, and asked about various conditions within the Army. According to Lt. Colonel SUZUKI, "The Army has no idea whatsoever of insisting that it must be HIRANUMA or SAITO. Up to now, people from existing political parties, bound closely by favoritism, have become Premiers who have been men well along in years. And anyone looking at them would say, 'well'--and to think that such a man is at the helm of politics at such a critical period. This not only creates an unfavourable impression among the Army but also among the general public. So this is really the time for some man who possesses no favoritism, who is impartial, and who is not tied down by any obligations, to be brought forth. For this person to be young and clear-minded will, moreover, create a new atmosphere all around. So at this time, don't you think it would be good for KONOYE, in all justice, to act in the place of Prince SAIONJI. At such a critical period it would be the best if an Elder Statesman should be the guiding hand of the nation's administration, but since his age will not permit it, I wonder how it would be for KONOYE to act as a sort of Regent." Both SHIRATORI and SUZUKI were also persistent in their persuasion of this idea.

Excerpt from SAIONJI-FARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 49 - (pages 389-90)

19 July 1932

On the 19th, I dropped in for a moment at the Foreign Ministry; I went to SPIRATORI's room. He had a visitor, so I did not insist on entering his room. I then visited the room of TANI and ARITA, the Vice-Minister, and again returned to SPIRATORI's room. I asked him: "When I looked into your room a short time ago, a strange looking character was with you. Who is that fellow?" SPIRATORI answered: "Oh, he's MURAKAMI, Tokujiro, a person whom Lt. Col. SUZUKI is also well acquainted with." I then said to SPIRATORI: "Are you by any chance conspiring something -- I wonder? Don't ever do anything so foolish or you are going to cause trouble. Whatever you may think of doing, please remember that Prince SAIONJI, whom you personally know well, is still alive. I feel that since you have a rather good understanding of his ideas, you would never under any circumstances do anything to interfere with his public service to the Emperor. However, please give due consideration to what I'm now saying to you. In any case, you wouldn't do all kinds of things clandestinely without my knowledge, would you?"

To this he said: "No, I'm hiding nothing specially from you. I want you to keep this to yourself. To speak the truth, the person who was here since some time ago is an intimate friend of Lt. Col. SUZUKI. He came for the following reason. Leading financiers are obsessed by severe apprehensions and cannot settle down to their work unless the real objectives of the Army are clearly known. The so-called leading financiers, such as IWEDA, Seihin, YUKI, Toyotarō and GŌ, Seinosuke, have asked me to arrange a meeting with the Army leaders. In compliance with this request, I have been making secret arrangements to have them meet such persons of the Army as NAGATA, OMAHARA, SUZUKI, and YAMASITA in the near future. The person who was here a little while ago had come to discuss this forthcoming meeting. From the Foreign Office, TSUBOGUCHI and myself (SPIRATORI) will be present at the meeting."

Doc. 3150-49A.

昭和七年七月廿日

皇軍々福ト西園寺公第四十九回ヨリノ

抜萃

十九日ニ外務省ニ鳥渡寄ツ多處ガ白鳥ノ處ニオ客
ガアツタノデ自分ハ強イテ中ニ入ラナカツタ。夫
レカラ谷ヤ有田次官ノ部屋ニ行ツテ再ビ白鳥ノ處
ニ歸ツテ行ツテ「一体サツキモ鳥渡君ノ處ニ寄ツ
テ見タ處ガ變ナ男ノ人ガ來テ居タガアレア何ダ。」
ト言ツタ處ガ白鳥ハ「イヤアレハ村上徳次郎ト云
ツテ鈴木中佐ナンカモヨク知ツテ居ル男ダ。」夫
カラ自分ハ白鳥ニ向ツテ「マサカ君達ハ陰謀的ナ
コトハヤツテ居ヤシマイト思フケレドモソシナ莫
迦ナコトハマア止メテクレナイト困ル。何カ仕事
ヲスルニシテモ現在兎ニ角元老ノ存在シテ居ル中
ハ要スルニ君モ公爵ハヨク知ツテ居ルシ、又公爵
ノ考ニ就テモ相當ニ理解ガアル以上ハ兎ニ角公爵
ノ御奉公ニ邪間ニナルヤウナコトハマサカシヤシ
マイト思フケレドモ其邊ハヨク考ヘテ貰ヒタイ。
マサカ僕ニ隠シテイロンナコトラヤルヤウナコト
ハシマイナ。」ト云フ話ヲシタ處ガ「イヤ俺ハ別
ニ何も隠シハセヌ。實ハ君限リニシテ貰イテ貰ヒ
タイガサツキカラ來テ居タ人ハ鈴木中佐ノヨク知
ツテ居ル人デ、實ハドウモ軍部ノ方ノ眞意ガ分ラ

Doc. 3150-49A

2.

ナイト財界ノ連中ガ非常ニ一種ノ不安ニ脅サレテ仕事ガ手ニ付カナイ。テ軍ノ中堅ト所謂財界ノ有力者ノ池田正彬、結城豊太郎トカ或ハ郷誠之助ト云フ風ナ人達ト外務省カラハ自分ト坪上ガ出テマア自分ガ大体主権ノヤウナツモリデヤツチ貰ヒダイト言フカラマア極秘デ陸軍ノ永田、岡村、鈴木、山下ト云フヤウナ連中ト最近逢ハスコトニナツテ其話デサツキノ人ガ來テ居タンダ。」ト云フコトデアツタ。

昭和八年三月廿一日

陸軍之編之西國考

2014 14 14

1892 - 1893

Doc 3150-75A

[illegible]

3773A

Key

Doc. No. 3150-75A

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 75 - (page 555)

About 17 March 1933

Then the Imperial rescript, which will be issued simultaneously with the notification of withdrawal, seems to be still under discussion. With regard to the wording, "the Imperial policy, etc.," in it, Asia Bureau Chief TANI went to the War Minister and changed it to "the independence of Manchuria" clarifying its meaning. Though Japan has emphasized the independence of Manchuria in various countries since the Manchurian Incident, yet there are indications that a portion of the Army used "the Imperial policy" and intentionally avoided the word independence, saying that if "independence" were used it would be inconvenient in case Manchuria should be annexed to Japan in the future. For the reason that such a thing should never be done for the honor of Japan, the War Minister was persuaded against his will and the definite wording "the independence of Manchukuo" was finally used.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

J. P. S. Doc. No. 3150-77A

Exhibit No.

西園寺原田日記 第七十二回

よりの扱サ卒

……決して聯盟を脱退にしようと言て他の事柄に就
てまで聯盟と意見交換をする立場にゐるのではないと云
ふ事ともう一つは文武各々其職に恪循し所謂統帥府と
内閣、即ち政治機関と統帥機関の間には各々整然たる
区別があるお互に侵犯し合ふ事がない此の事と今日の時
勢に鑑みれば特に高調せられた此二点は實に陛下。最
も御注意を賜はられた處であつて外務大臣に対しても或は
内大臣に対しても及々こゝろ御注意の御注意がある。
其處で閣議に其原案があつた時に文武各其職に
恪循し其下に又上下格と牽き出すか或は上下格に従ふと
か云ふやうな文句を大抵軍人と言はず文官と言はず各々
現行の下には事としてあるといふ意味の事と申に入れた
らうか。といふ議論もあつたけれどもどう云ふものか其不
睦軍大臣に夫に対しては右対しに爲にといふ其言
葉は入らなかつた。

Doc. No. 3150-77A

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 77 - (page 566)

About 3 April 1933

Japan is not taking a stand that she disagrees with the League of Nations on other matters /than those which concern Manchuria/

. . . . There should be a systematic distinction between the political organ and the organ of the supreme command and a mutual avoidance of intruding in each other's affairs

The above two points were most stressed by His Majesty, and on several occasions the Emperor cautioned along these lines.

And so, when this draft was submitted to a Cabinet council, some advocated: "What do you say to inserting such words as 'both high and low should listen to reason?', 'both high and low should act upon reason?', or the like, following the words 'both civil and military officials should respectfully assume their respective duties', in order to insert words to the effect that both military personnel and civil officials are working in good order?" But, for some reason or other, War Minister ARAKI opposed this, and the words were not inserted after all.

昭和八年十月十四日

陸軍軍縮と西園寺公

第百一回の板葺

Doc. No. 3150-101A

夫から歸つてから外務省に行った父が重光次官は非常に心配する面持で「どうも陸軍は廿五年にはどうもしないで、やりたいと云ふやうな氣持がある」といふ。海軍は廿六年に本國と戦はんと云ふやうな氣持がある」といふ。非常に心配してゐる。夫から自分は「それは少し心配し過ぎないか」と云ふ話をして直した。結局向來の鐵道の買収問題に關して漸く出来がよくなる時に陸軍から横槍が入る。こんな問題が起ると痛切に云ふ風に感した。

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 101 - (p. 707)

About 14 October 1933.

I went to the Foreign Ministry after returning (T.N. from Okitsu). Vice Minister SHIGEMITSU, with a very grave look, stated: "The Army seems determined to attack Russia in 1935, and the Navy the United States in 1936." I asked him: "Aren't you over-worrying yourself?" But he seems to feel this atmosphere intensely because of many developments, for example the interference of the Army just as the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway was about completed.

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 103, (page 718)

19 October 1933

On the 19th I met Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU at the Foreign Ministry. Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU seems to take a pessimistic view of the whole situation. He made various statements concerning the Russian problem, our China policy, general disarmament, Japanese-American problems and the League. He said: "The Navy is demanding equality in armaments; it is stressing the fact that should this demand be denied, it will abrogate the Naval Disarmament Treaty. In other words, /the Navy/ is demanding equality in the sense of reserving the right to maintain a basic minimum of armaments absolutely necessary for national defense and by abrogation of the Treaty." ~~insert even the wording "to be prepared to take a further step"~~

IPS DOC. No. 3150-103A

Exh. NO. _____

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 103, (page 718)

19 October 1933

On the 19th I met Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU at the Foreign Ministry. Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU seems to take a pessimistic view of the whole situation. He made various statements concerning the Russian problem, our China policy, general disarmament, Japanese-American problems and the League. He said: "The Navy is demanding equality in armaments; it is stressing the fact that should this demand be denied, it will abrogate the Naval Disarmament Treaty. In other words, /the Navy/ is demanding equality in the sense of reserving the right to maintain a basic minimum of armaments absolutely necessary for national defense and by abrogation of the Treaty." ~~insert even the wording "to be prepared to take a further step"~~

IPS DOC. No. 3150-103A

Exh. NO. _____

西園寺、原田日記百〇三章カラノ抜萃

一九三三年十月十九日

Doc. 3140-103 A

夫レカラ十九日ノ日ニ自分ハ外務省ニ行ツテ重光
次官ニ逢ツタ處ガ、如何ニモ重光次官ハ凡テ大體ニ於テ
悲觀的デゾ。デ對露問題、對支政策、或ハ一般軍縮、
對米問題、或ハ對聯盟問題ニ就テイロイロ語シテ居
タガ、海軍ハ平等權ヲ主張シ、破レタラ軍縮條約
破棄、ト。要スルニ矢張り防禦ノ最小限度ヲ主張ス
ル意味ニ於テノ平等權デアツテ、兵條約破棄ハ言換
ヘレバ決裂ヲ辭セヌ。ト云フ文句ヲモ入レテ置
キタイト云フ氣持デアツタラシイ。

IPS Doc. No 3/50-127B

Exhibit No.

西園寺原田日記第百一十七回、板屋

夫から自今迄は朝晩号電報で公爵の意見を記
密院の議長の時長根と内大臣は青浦伯と推
して居るといふ事細は本末からよく聞かぬと
を打つて置いた。

夫から午後には總理大臣に逢つた處が「大隈三三」
人も非常な高幹であるから平旦に因果を金
所謂政治運動、國體社と國體人は、
つたらうといふ事小記であるから夫から自今迄は
爵は軍に軍治を議長にするに就て好いと思ふ
のでなう、秘書院議長、地位、
大である、のみならず其地位に居る平旦の世も
うんは運動に携りたりする、は寧ろ運動
動だのなん、と益々人にする、
即ちある類の人に勢力も張られると云ふ事は
当は重大な結果を得るから其点に政府の意思
で心配して居られる。

Excerpt from SAITOJI - HIRANUMA MEMOIRS

Chapter 127 - (pages 864-5)

27 April 1934

Then the following morning I sent a code telegram to the Prince telling him that the President of the Privy Council had handed in his letter of resignation, that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal recommends Count KIYOURA, and to ask KIDO for details.

I met the Premier in the afternoon and he said: "Since KIYOURA is very old too, how about persuading HIRANUMA to fulfil his duties with the understanding that he would not participate in the so-called political activities and the Kokuhonsha?" Then I said: "The Prince is not simply saying whether it is good or bad for HIRANUMA to become President of the Privy Council, but that the position of the President of the Privy Council is very important, and not only that but it would be very troublesome if a person like HIRANUMA should, by staying in that position, participate in the various movements or, in short, stimulate Rightist activities. And when a person of that type should come to wield power, extremely serious consequences will follow, and that is why the Prince is worried from a broad political point of view in regard to that point."

L.S. DOC. NO. 5150-145A

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

PART VII

"ORGANIZING MANCHUKUO"

Chapter 146

Pages 984-5

28 August, 1934.

I asked KIDO to remain and told him of the talk with the Grand Chamberlain -- viz., the suggested admonition of the two Princes by the Emperor. KIDO was of the opinion: "It would tend to create an atmosphere similar to that at the time of the London Conference. The criticism itself, which would be directed against his advisers, would be all right but the creation of such an atmosphere would not be desirable. Therefore, it would be better to wait for a while, wouldn't it?"

3777A

昭和九年九月十三日

陸軍省編纂部長 岡田 公

軍部官制

陸軍省

Doc 3150-148A

夫から編纂部は、自らは整理し、今迄は、
 水程が、とて、水程も整理し、現に昨日陸軍
 大臣が、閣議で、第一師團長、柳川中
 將、陸軍大臣の、お父さん、と云ふは、元来、
 本、無、柳川中將は、始めから、前、
 であつた、一、二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十、
 (と云ふ、一、二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十、)

Doc. No. 315C - 148A

Exh. No. 3777A

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 148 - (page 1008)

11 September 1934

Next, when I also talked to the Premier, he too said, "I didn't think it was so serious until now. However, it is extremely dubious. Actually, after the War Minister returned from my place yesterday, the 1st Division Commander in question, Lt. General YANAGAWA, stayed constantly in the War Minister's room. The reason for this is, the faction composed of ARAKI, MASAKI, and YANAGAWA was always in favor of the annexation of Manchuria. On the one hand, they wish to carry out actively their will to the end and on the other hand, they believe that it is a very good reason for overthrowing the Cabinet.

Exhibit No.

D.P.S. Que 3150-174B

西園寺 原田日記ヨリ、抜萃

第百七十四回

夫から尚ほ総理に会つて処が、北支の事件は金
部要求も容れて形付くらしい。どうも往々話を
南くと梅津司令官が新京に發つ前に、酒井
参謀長が『好意的に極めて軽い意味の警告も
貴下の留守中に発したいと思ひますが、どうやら
うふ』と言つて来たから、梅津司令官は『それほら
宜し』と云ふことであつたのが、結局あんまりに
なつた誤りである』と云ふことと言つて歸つた。

DOC. No. 3150-174B

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 174 - (page 1244)

11 June, 1935.

And then I met the Premier and he said something to the following effect: "It looks like the North China Incident will be settled with all demands acceded to. From what I have heard now and then, before Commander UMEZU started for Hsinking, Chief of Staff SAKAI said: 'I would like in a friendly manner to issue a warning in the lightest sense of the word, during your absence. How would that be? Commander UMEZU replied: 'That will be all right.' Well, this is how things got the way they were".

Exhibit No.

西園寺原日記 第百八十回

「リ」の授華

「リ」から其後外務省に行つて重光次官に会つた処が「イギリスから軍縮の案を持つて来た。それでイギリスは實の制限をやらなうと言つて来たが海軍では『量』の制限をしなうと置いて實の制限だけをやらうと云ふことは然る」と言つて反對をして居る。で結局どうも海軍の様子を見よと『凡て將來他国から拘束を受けなければ利益である』と云ふ説明で餘程感情的になつて居る」と云ふことを言つて居る。

「リ」がどうも「リ」から先づ様子を日々と外國は日本に軍縮の會議が不成立の責任を負はせて来るやうな形勢を不成立の此問題が小さく取扱ふで完全に日本が難しい事を云ふことになり、英國と全面的關係に之が波及しやしないかと云ふことを懸念する。まあ何とか綺麗を風呂敷に包んであんまりことのないやうにして見たい」と云ふことを云ひ先づ頼りに言つて居る。

IPS Doc. No. 3150-180A

378A
Exhibit No. _____

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 180 - (p. 1294)

21 August 1935.

Then I went to the Foreign Office and met Vice Minister SHIGEMITSU. He /SHIGEMITSU/ said: "Great Britain has proposed a plan for disarmament. She proposed 'qualitative limitation of armament'; however, the Navy is opposing it, saying that: 'It is meaningless to limit the quality /of armament/ without limiting the quantity'. The attitude of the Navy seems to be that 'it is to our advantage, never in future to accept limitations from other countries'. The Navy is very touchy on this matter.

"However, looking at the situation as it may develop other countries would place the responsibility of the failure of the Disarmament Conference on Japan, so this problem has to be treated delicately. Definitely, Japan would have to make a difficult proposition which I fear might disrupt the entire relationship with Great Britain. I would like to wrap this /proposal of the Navy/ in a pretty cloth and try to avoid any trouble" emphatically stated SHIGEMITSU.

Exhibit No.

J.P.S Doc. 3/50-192A

西園寺原田日記 第百九十三回よりの抜粋

それから外務大臣に會つては、支那の問題は今より立
て、言ふことはないが、餘程支那の方から何とか打開した
と云ふので、閣議會議を開き、たゞと云ふ事を言つてまゐ
るけれども、先づ排日とか抗日とかいふ運動をもく取締
つて、お互に考へよう、と云ふ事だ、と云ふやうな事で、
此方は引張つて居る。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 192 (page 1397)

27 December 1935

When I met the Foreign Minister afterward, he stated:
"There is nothing particular to be mentioned on the China problem. China, however, is proposing "the opening of a Nan-king Conference" as she is earnestly desirous of "bringing about a new turn in the situation in some way or other," but we are hesitating about giving China any decisive reply, merely stating: 'Let us consider this matter only after anti-Japanese movements are well under control.'"

EXHIBIT No.

Doc 3150-208A

西園寺原田日記

第二百八回もろの夜半

それから昨日の干後總理に会つた處が今日干前
の閣議で.....

石油保有義務と三月外國会社もやる。それ以
上はウニクと作つて行く。

EXHIBIT No.

Doc 3150-208A

西園寺原田日記

第二百八回もの夜半

それから昨日の干後總理に会つた處が今日干前
の閣議で.....

石油保有義務と三月外國会社もやる。それ以外
はタニクを作つて行く。

IPS Doc. No. 3150 - 208A

Exhibit No. _____

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 208 - (page 1538)

30 June 1936

In the afternoon of the 30th, I /HARADA/ met the Premier. The Premier said: "At the Cabinet meeting which convened this morning, /they decided/ foreign oil companies shall maintain a supply of oil for 3 months, and for the rest, tanks shall be erected. "

IPS Doc. No. 3150 - 224A

Exhibit No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 224 - (page 1654)

12 December 1936

I then met the Premier on the 12th. The /Premier/ said, "Since military operations in the SUIYUAN area will probably become impossible due to weather conditions, I believe I should like to have diplomatic steps taken. Although we should at least have the determination not to stand idle in the event that the Central Chinese Army can enter as far as CHAHAR, whether we should advance further to that point or not is a separate problem." That is, he said, "Since it is said that Wang ying, a subordinate of Prince Te, has communicated with the Central Chinese Army, I believe that combat morale will not rise."

JPS Doc. No. 3150-224A

EXHIBIT No.

西園寺原田日記第二百二十四回を抄す

それから十二日に總理に會つたが、總ての關係
で軍事行動は不可能にあらうから、外交工作で
行ふだと思ふ。支那の中央軍がペールにちかへる
と云ふ場合には黙して居らぬと云ふ決心は持て
居なければならぬ。いづれも更に進んで其處まで行くか
行かぬかは別問題だ、と云ふ話である。即ち總ての
分である王英は、支那の中央軍に款と通じたと言
つて居るから、戦鬭の氣勢は上るかも知れない。

9PS Doc No 3150-240A

EXHIBIT No.

西園寺原田日記 才二百四十回も抜粋

----- 成るべく速く總裁と決めたことなので、近頃公使は
是非石田外相に副總理としての意味で全權廳の
總裁に即承諾を願ひたい。-----

----- 石田外相は「それなら自命は、受け取ろう」と
言つて早速承諾された。

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 240 - (pages 1797-8)

7 June 1937

/T.N. HARADA speaking to HIROTA/

. As Prince KONOYE desires to decide the presidency as soon as possible he sincerely requests you to accept the presidency of the Planning Board assuming the status as if of a Vice-Premier." Foreign Minister HIROTA promptly agreed, saying: "In that case, I shall accept the post."

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 244 - (pages 1820-21)

12 July 1937

Then the War Minister determined to rescue the five thousand men at Tientsin, declared at a Cabinet meeting, 'This time I definitely would like to have troops sent out.' Then Premier KONOYE said, 'I do not want to expand the issue. It may be all right to despatch troops according to necessity.' In this way, he agreed with the War Minister, but he added, 'If we oppose the dispatching of troops at this time and do not heed the wishes of the Army, the War Minister will be compelled to resign. Consequently, the Cabinet will have to resign, also. If I resign, somebody will eventually have to accept this position, but as there may be no one who can possibly check the Army, there is no other way than for me to assume the responsibility and confront the issue.' Thus, Premier KONOYE made an extremely touching decision.

Then the War Minister finally stated that he would definitely 'not expand the issue.' His Majesty received in audience His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the General Staff, twice, and His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, once. The War Minister said that he would settle the issue neatly by sending a large force to smash the opposition and then withdraw quickly, but when asked, 'Can you carry it out as expected?', the War Minister was not able to give a definite answer." Such is what the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal told me.

On the afternoon of the 12th, a report came saying that the Chinese Army would accept all our demands. Prior to that, when the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the War Minister were talking, an adjutant came and said, "A telegram has come from Tientsin saying, 'Accepted all our demands.' It is a very sincere answer." It is probable that the War Minister did not want to hear this report in front of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, but it actually happened.

These demands were, the withdrawal of troops, guarantee of the future, and the punishment of responsible officers. The officers of the Chinese Army are justifying themselves by saying, "The troops are being influenced by the Communists."

In the Army, even the General Staff Headquarters thought, "Let us make an agreement" was probably a Chinese attempt to make us stop our military preparation." Thus, it seems that the Army, as long as it has decided to despatch troops, wants to put forth more stringent demands.

1. P. S. Doc. No. 3750-247A

Exhibit No.

西園寺原田日記 第二卷十七回

一、校 華

尚ほ總理に会つる處が「實は最近南朝鮮總督
及び関東軍司令官、即ち植田大將と兩方から
北支に新たな政權を樹立する運動の連白書が出た。
勿論こんなものは取立の要はな、けれども、一種の
倒閣の企図と見ても好や、に感ぜられ」と云ふ
話がある。

DOC. No. 3150-247A

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 247 - (page 1845)

29 July, 1937.

I met the Premier later and he said: "A written petition for the movement of establishing a new administration in North China has been issued recently by both MINAMI, the Governor-General of Korea, and Gen. UYEDA, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. Of course, we need not accept this; however, I think that we may presume this to be a premise to a movement to overthrow the Cabinet."

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

PART XIII

"STRESS AND STRAIN IN THE CABINET"

Chapter 256

Page 1934

Nov. 16th 1937.

KIDO stated: "It is extremely outrageous to think of such a thing (for KONOYE to think of resigning) at the present. It will be said that KONOYE died in the ditch. First of all, it would be an inexcusable act against the Emperor. Also, the people will receive a great shock. The people overrate you (KONOYE) and their expectations from you (KONOYE) are quite big. At present, a great number of them say: 'KONOYE is taking care of matters,' and have set their minds at ease. If something sudden like this should happen (resignation of KONOYE), there may be panic in the financial world. If the exchange should depreciate internationally, Japan would be unable to purchase anything from foreign countries. Looking at the situation from a diplomatic and political angle; if the central government should do something like that when the officials in the field are doing their best and when the Army is gaining victories with a great deal of zest and is exerting itself to the utmost, China will make a mockery of it and Japan will lose prestige in the eyes of the other nations. Therefore, I think that a move at the present moment is definitely out. If he resigns and the Emperor asks the Genro (Prince SAIONJI) about the next Premier, he will probably suggest that the Emperor give the Imperial command (to form a Cabinet) again to KONOYE. If KONOYE has no intention of accepting that command, I (KIDO) told him I was against the message (KONOYE's intention to resign) being transmitted (to SAIONJI)".

Doc. 3/50 - 257A

西園寺 原田日記(三二、四)より取録
一九三七年(昭和十二年)十二月三日

とれから高橋外務大臣、注しに知「ああ
上流のものはさう／＼と、もう見せ付いた。
我が米國の旗とほどもに汽船、爆弾を投
じ、事に就く。日本は遺憾の意を表
す。」「と云ふ事がある。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 257 - (page 1959)

3 December 1937

Furthermore, I had a talk with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he spoke to the effect that: As to the talk concerning Shanghai, there was confusion, but it had been brought to a close. And as to the case in which a bomb was dropped on a ship flying the American flag, it was settled by expressing regrets on the part of the Japanese Government.

西園寺公望日記(第三卷)三、夜半

一九三七年(昭和十二年)十二月十四日

Doc 258-b

より外務省で外務次官に会ふことも、海軍の航空隊でアメリカの戦艦を爆撃することも決まらなかつた。それから又それから前後して、アメリカの軍艦を南京で砲撃して、怪我をふしたり、更に國を悩ましたと云ふてゐた。それから、アメリカの軍艦は無論、小な河川用の軍艦にせよ、南京の上流二十六哩の処に居たものを、橋本欣五郎が其隊長である部隊が、橋本の命令に依つて撃つた。それで、早速外務大臣は、アメリカ大使に遺憾の意を表しに行き、それから、アメリカに対しては遺憾の意を表し、英國にも遺憾の意を表し、英國へもさうする。で、さうして海軍の軍務局長が来て、日本海軍は是非アメリカの大統領と、アメリカの皇帝に対し、帝親電をやつて戴きたらと云ふやうな事で、どうなるかもう少し、人々に研究した上で措置をしたらと云ふ話であつた。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 258 - (pages 1974-5)

14 December 1937

Then, when I met the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, /he/ said, "The Naval Air Force bombed and sank an American merchant ship and just about that time, an English warship was shelled at Nanking from the hills and injuries to personnel were caused. This is really very distressing." Next /he/, said, "The English warship was, of course, a small warship for use on rivers. However, when it was 26 miles upstream from Nanking, it was fired upon by the regiment commanded by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, at the order of HASHIMOTO. The Foreign Minister intends to go immediately to the American Ambassador to express our feeling of regret and to send a note expressing our regret to England. /TN. Japanese ambiguous here. Can be interpreted: The Foreign Minister went immediately to and intends to send /. Furthermore, at the Cabinet meeting, it is intended that our feeling of regret be expressed to the United States and also to England. A short time ago, the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau came and said, 'If it can be done, the Navy would, by all means, like to have the Emperor send a personal telegram to the President of the United States and to the King of England.' I would like to take measures after jointly studying developments a little more."

Doc 3/50-259B

西園寺公望日記(第三十九回)ヨリノ抜萃

九三六年(昭和十一年)十二月三十日

二十日には英軍の軍艦と日本海軍の艦隊が砲撃した。これも亦全く誤認に依るものだ。云ふ同様に、一應英軍に通牒を出して、先づ今の要領を何の支那軍もなければ、事柄は善い。云ふが、誤認に依るものだ。

IPS Doc. No. 3150 - 2593

Exhibit No. _____

Excerpt from "SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 259 - (page 1986)

30 December 1937

On the 30th, a note was sent to England with the reply that the shelling of the British warship by the Japanese Army was also entirely based on a misunderstanding, and, although there is as yet no reverberations, the situation has become such that the matter is said to be closed.

西園寺原田日記(第三六回)より抜粋

一九三八年(昭和十三年)一月八日

自分は直ぐ宮城から出てもう一遍總理の官邸に行
つて總理に會つて「実は斯う云ふ話で自分はこれから三時
の富士で興津に行か」と言つた處が近衛は「実は
海軍も外務省も吾々は御前會議を非常中に急いで居る
訳いやあないんだけれども又御前會議がそれ程必要だ
は思はないけれど唯陸軍が矢張りあせつて居るのとい
うして十二日頃には支那側の意向が多かりける等
なのだけれど」にすぬと松井南軍司令官が非常
に強硬な意見を出張して来るのでこれを抑へる
のにも矢張り御前會議の決めたこと云ふことを抑
へたいと云ふ陸軍大臣たちの希望であつて、謂は
甚だ卑怯な話であつて陛下も道目大に使はふと云ふ
人だから其の怪しからん話だと思ふけれどもまあ
此場合己いを得ないから願はふとして居るんだ
と云ふ話で、さうして「今隣の宮に軍令部長
や參謀次長が来つていろいろ文句な人を直して居る
んだから參謀次長な人に至つては洵に分らない先
生でよくあつて今まで行つた自分な人も思つてゐる」

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
Chapter 260 - (pp 1991-2)

8 January 1938.

Thereupon, I immediately left the Palace and once again went over to the official residence of the Premier and told him; "Due to the foregoing story, I am leaving on the 3:00 o'clock express "Fuji" for Okitsu..." To which Premier KONOYE answered: "To tell you the truth, neither the Navy nor the Foreign Ministry are in a great hurry to have the Council in the presence of the Emperor. Moreover, they do not feel that there is such a great necessity to have such a conference. Only the Army seems anxious to have such a Council, possibly due to the fact that the views on the part of China are expected to be somewhat clarified around the 12th. Furthermore, as both Commander-in-Chiefs TERAUCHI and MATSUI have expressed very strong opinions, it is the desire of the Minister of War and others to express their views before the above date by saying: 'It was determined at the Council held in the presence of His Majesty.' Of course this is a cowardly thing to do. Moreover, as they intend to use His Majesty as a tool, I think it is scandalous, but as it cannot be helped in this instance, I intend to request that such a Council be convened. The Premier also stated: "The Deputy Chief of the Naval General Staff and the Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff are in the next room right now and are straightening out the phraseology. The Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff is such an unreasonable fellow, I sometimes wonder how he ever got as far as he did."

IPS DOC. NO. 3150-260D

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

PART XIV

"KONOYE SEEMS RELIEF"

Chapter 260

Page 1993

Jan. 8th 1938.

.....At the same time he (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) said:
"Premier KONOYE has just left from calling at the Palace. Upon being
granted an audience with His Majesty, Premier KONOYE said: 'It has
been determined at the meeting of the Cabinet members that it would
be wiser for His Majesty if he does not say anything at the Council
which is to be held in His Presence at the Grand Imperial Headquarters
tomorrow. I beg of His Majesty to attend the Council in silence.'

IPS DOC. NO. 3150-261A

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

PART XIV

"KONOYE SEEKS RELIEF"

Chapter 261
Pages 2009-10

28 January 1938.

Before I (HARADA) left for Oiso on the eve of the 28th, I spoke to KIDO and cautioned him on various matters. I also requested him to see KONOYE and have a long talk with him. The following morning when I called KIDO to find out about the state of things, he said: "I met KONOYE for a short while and it seemed that he was quite distressed over the situation of the General Budget meeting. As for the Imperial Rescript problem, it will definitely be, in general, similar to the Imperial Rescript which is presented at state ceremonies. Plans are under way to see that only special matters are not aimed at. It is also quite a problem to subdue KONOYE but I'll (KIDO) try to do so".

Doc. 3150-263B

西園寺原田日記 第二百六十三回より抜萃

よりから二三日前は木戸文相に会つた時に自分が彼是不満
の事を心配して、あんまり右傾の言ふ事に深入りなせうに
一言と識者の同情を失ふぞと云ふ語をいふに、木戸は小野
塚博士とか長興然長とも相談してやつて居るから、安心しろと
言ふ……

IPS DOC. NO. 5150-263B

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

PART XIV

"KONOYE SEEKS RELIEF"

Chapter 265

Page 2035

About 18 January, 1938.

I was very much concerned about Education Minister KIDO, so when I met him a few days ago, I told him: "You will lose the confidence of the intellectuals if you do not refrain from getting involved by doing everything according to the wishes of the Rightists". KIDO answered: "I am conducting matters upon consulting Dr. ONOZUKA and President NAGANO, so do not worry".

I.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-264A

西園寺原田日記 第二百六十四回

昭和十三年一月二十六日 時の夜華

「それから廿六日に又本戸に会つて見た処が、どうも

この重大法案に就くとなか／＼纏まらな心……

Exhibit No.

Doc. No. 7150-264A

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 264 (page 2043)

26 ^{January} ~~February~~ 1938

"On the 26th, I again met KIDO and he remarked: 'Very great difficulty is being encountered in connection with the settlement of the two important bills /National Mobilization and the Electric Power/.'"

Excerpt from SAIONJI HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 264 - (pp. 2044-5)

14 February 1938

I saw the Vice Foreign Minister at the Foreign Ministry and he inquired: "Have you heard about the Liaison Conference of February 14th?" Therefore, I (HARADA) replied: "What about it?" To this, the Vice Minister stated: "At the Liaison Conference of February 14, the Army said: 'It is impossible to attack Canton and Hankow in the future. We shall go as far as the southern part of Shansi and up to the Yellow River but we think it is impossible to advance as far as Suchow.' The Navy is saying that it would like to advance its air base as far as Anking, but the Army is saying that it is impossible to go that far. The reason why they say it is impossible to carry out military operations as far as Anking lies in the fact that military preparations must be made against Russia. As a result the Navy is saying: 'It is not wise to continue as we are and extending the incident into one of long term hostilities. On one hand, cessation of war should be attempted through diplomatic manoeuvres and at the same time, our forces must advance without yielding an inch.' The foregoing is the Navy's stand and they say: 'Can Canton be attacked? What about Hankow, Suchow and Anking?' Even in that event, nothing can be done. The reason is due to military preparations against Russia. Therefore, the Navy requested (T.N. Prince FUSHIMI), the Chief of the Naval General Staff to inquire of (T.N. Prince YAN-IN) the Chief of the Army General Staff: 'The Army repeatedly speaks of the Soviet relationship, but are we not intending to, (against Russia) force it from our side?' Prince YAN-IN denied the foregoing saying: 'There is no such thing.'

His Majesty, the Emperor, then asked the Minister of War /'Is it possible to put into effect a simultaneous plan for long term hostilities, military preparations against Russia and the expansion of the Navy/?' The Army Minister replied: 'I shall discuss the matter with the Government and take the proper action.'

1922. 2. 23 150-2640

Exhibit A. 40

西園寺原田日記 第三卷六十四回

大正十三年

昭和十三年二月二十六日

……水から外務省で外務次官に會つては「二月十四日
 の聯絡會議の事を知らず居る」と云ふ語であつたが
 り「どう云ふん」とも言つて居たが「二月十四日の聯絡
 會議に陸軍は……此迄迄迄……」と云ふも亦も必撃す
 誤には……山西の南、冀州の線迄……云々……
 も餘計な……行く事は出来な……海軍は「豫定隊の基
 地を安慶まで進めた」と云ふ……云々……
 安慶まで進める事も出来な……云々……
 結局此軍事行動が……迄迄迄……云々……
 策戰の準備とする為に出る……云々……
 海軍は結局此儘で……云々……
 黙つて居る……云々……
 速く終結する為には……同時に……云々……
 下つたり……云々……
 海軍の建策である……云々……
 用……云々……
 或は……云々……
 なる……云々……
 なる……云々……
 官に……云々……

1. P. 5. Doc. No. 5150-26x3

此方から仕掛り、案ずるは、「やうな事」と云ふ事と
閑院宮殿下に聞かされた後、閑院宮殿下は「やうな
事ける、「日と言つてゐる定し居る水左と云ふ誰であ
つた、「水左、陛下は
『長期抗戦』対し準備と海軍拡張、此三つを同時に
に成立せしむ事ができるか」
と云ふ事を陸軍大臣に尋ねられたが、陸軍大臣
は「「何れ政府と相談致し、「一々善処致しませう」」と
云ふ事と回答した。

IPS DOG# 3150-275A

西園寺原田日記

卷一百一十四

昭和十一年五月一日

九時半頃本所に行き見ると各戸は、
大喧嘩調に行つて居る。
それを見ても早垣と女傭人等、
そりして天孫陸軍大臣は、
居る訳なく早速返す。のちから
一寸話をして居る間に風見草
席をけし、別室に行き、
官長が歸つた後下着を脱ぎ、
美に行き、松江に交さず、
不明瞭か明後晩までには天津で
と思ふから、さうすれば、順調に
託事あり。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 275 - (page 3175)

23 May 1938

"After that, I /HARADA/ went to KIDO's place around 9.30. KIDO said: 'On the whole, things are going smoothly. I think that there's no question that IKEDA and UGAKI will join the Cabinet. As regards the post of War Minister, a messenger has already gone to ITAGAKI and I think that there will be an immediate answer.' We talked for a while then KAZAMI, the Chief Secretary /of the Cabinet/ arrived. I slipped away and waited in another room. After the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet went home, I /HARADA/ again met KIDO. He said: 'The Chief of the Personnel Bureau has gone to North China to approach ITAGAKI. I think there will be a reply from Tientsin either tomorrow night or the night after that, in which case, everything will move smoothly.'"

昭和十三年六月六日

莖軍々緒ト西園寺公

第二百七十七回ヨリノ拔萃

ソレカラ廿九日ノ朝十時外務省へ行テ字垣大臣ニ
會ツタ處ガ「當分マア研究シテ見ヨウト思フ。デ、
「次官モ將來或ハ疑ヘルカモ知レナイケレドモ、
當分マア君ガヤツテクレト云フ事ヲ、次官ニ言
ツテ置イタト云フ字垣サンノ話デアリ、ソレカ
ラ「白鳥ナンカラ頻リニ運動ニ來ル者ガアツタカ
ラ、ソレカラ、「假令自分ガ白鳥ガヨクツテ、是
非何ヲ次官ニシヨウト思ツテモ、サウ云フ形式デ
持ツテ來ラレタラ、好イコトモ出來ナイデハナイ
カト言ツテ、聽ヘシテヤツタ。ソレ以來黙ツテ
何トモ言ツテ來ント云フ話デアツタ。

Doc. 3140-277A

IPS DOC. NO. 3150-277A

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-FARADA LETTERS

Chapter 277 - (page 2137)

29 May 1938

I /FARADA/ went to the Foreign Ministry and met Minister UGAKI at ten in the morning on the 29th. UGAKI said: "I think that I shall study things for a while. I have told the Vice Minister: 'I may change the Vice Minister in the future, but I want you to continue for the time being.' There are some people who come to me trying to push SPIRATORI. I told them. 'Even if I thought SPIRATORI was good and by all means wanted to make him Vice Minister, if you suggest the matter in this manner, how can I carry it through even if it is good?' and sent them away. Since then, they stopped and nothing has been said."

昭和十三年六月廿日

陸軍々緒ト西園寺公

第二百七十八回ヨリノ抜萃

Doc. 3150-278A

「ソレカラ當日ノ午後近衛ニ總理ノ官邸デ會ツタ處ガ
「今日實ハ晝食事ヲシ乍ラ宇垣外務大臣、池田大藏大
臣ト自分ト三人デ、所謂三相會議ヲシ乍ラ、マア話ヲ
シタ處ガ、宇垣ハ板垣陸軍大臣カラ頻リニ白鳥ヲ外務
次官ニシタラドウカト云フ事ヲ疑メラレタ。デ、板垣
ハ戰線ニ居ル時ニ白鳥ガ北支中文ヲ廻ツタ時ニ、四時
間バカリイロ々々話シテ見テ、非常ニ外交上ノ意見ガ
一致シタト云フ話デアル。デ、近衛ノ言フノニハ「一
番今宇垣ニ對シテ何處ガ難問ダト言ヘバ、矢張陸軍ノ
中堅階級ガ五月廻イ。デ、何カ宇垣ガ外交ノ事ヲシヨ
ウト思ツテモ矢張アレヲヨク抑ヘ乍ラ又一緒ニヤツテ
行クヤウナ形デナイト、ナンニモ出來ナイ。デ、白鳥
ハ外務省ノ先輩ニモヨクナイシ多少外部ニモ惡イケレ
ドモ、然シ宇垣ガ使ヘバ又適當ニヤルダラウカラ、白
鳥ヲトル事が一番自分ハ政治的ニ見テヨイト思フケレ

2. ドモ、海軍ハ全面的ニ白鳥ニ反對デアル。殊ニ山本次官ハ白鳥ノ素行上ノ事デ「トテモ官紀上ア、云フモノハ置ケナイ」ト言フケレドモ、ソシテ窮屈ナ事ヲ言ハナイデモ、此際何トカナラナイダラフカ。デ、自分ハ強イテ責任ヲ以テ白鳥ヲ斃メル事ハ自分トシテハシナイケレドモ、事實ハ一番白鳥ガ好インジヤナイカト思フ「ト云フ話デアツタ。サウシテ附加ヘテ近衛ノ言フノニ「今日モ字垣ガ、「白鳥ハ多少經濟ニ非常ニル」ズデアルト云フヤウナ事モ聞イテ居ルガ、陸軍ニヨケレバ海軍ニ悪イシ、ドウモ困ツタモンダ」ト云フ話デアツタ。」

Kloc. 3150-278A

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 27 (pages 214-9)

16 June 1937

That afternoon, I (HARADA) met KONOYE at the Premier's official residence. He said: "This noon Foreign Minister UGAKI, Finance Minister IKEDA and I held a so-called Three Ministers Meeting while we had lunch. War Minister ITAGAKI persisted in recommending SHIRATORI as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs to UGAKI. When ITAGAKI was at the front and SHIRATORI was touring through North and Central China, they talked for about four hours on various matters. It is said their opinions on foreign relations coincided very well. The ones who are still the greatest nuisance to UGAKI at present are the field grade officers of the Army. If UGAKI wants to carry out some foreign policy matter, he will have to hold them down and yet let it appear that he is cooperating with them. Otherwise, he won't be able to accomplish anything. SHIRATORI is not considered highly by his seniors in the Foreign Ministry, and his reputation outside of the Ministry is somewhat bad. However, if UGAKI were to use him, he would probably handle him appropriately. I think that using SHIRATORI would be very good politically. However, the Navy is wholly opposed to him. Vice Minister YAMAMOTO especially says that in view of SHIRATORI's personal conduct: 'We cannot keep such a man for official disciplinary reasons.' However, can't something be done on this occasion without saying such straitlaced things? I will not assume any responsibility in forcibly recommending SHIRATORI. However, in reality, I still think that SHIRATORI would probably be the best suited person. UGAKI told me today: 'I have heard that SHIRATORI is to some extent very 'loose' with his finances. If he's acceptable to the Army, he isn't to the Navy. This is really an awkward situation.'"

西園寺原田日記 卷二 八回より、後章

それから廿日の午後五時頃から恰度近衛總理
が風邪のために引籠り中であつたので、電話でか
けた処が事ないかと。

9.P.S Doc No. 3150-2

Exhibit 6

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 280 - (pages 2164-65)

4 July 1938

On the 30th, about 5:00 p.m., hearing that Premier KONOYE was laid up with a cold, I telephoned him. Since KONOYE said to me "Come over," I called on him with the idea of expressing my sympathies and had supper together with him. We talked till 9:30 p.m. About 2 p.m. of that same day, Minister TANI had made a report to the Premier. When I asked about TANI, the Premier remarked: "TANI is very aggressive." Then, the Premier talked about the visit made by the Imperial Princes a few days ago. The Premier stated: "Since both of the Princes were fully aware of various matters, I complained a little about the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal." I thought to myself that this was distressing.

KONOYE also told me: "KISHI, the secretary at my place, KAGESA from the Army, and Captain OKA from the Navy dine together every week and talk on various matters. KISHI calls this gathering a meeting of the three ministers. KISHI told me: 'This is absolutely a secret, and I prefer that the Premier would not mention this until the War Minister mentions it to the Premier,' and stated the following: 'KAGESA will bring over KAO Tsung-wu, who, until recently, had been Chief of the Asia Bureau of the CHIANG Government, and confine him at the KAIKOSHA /Army Club/.' It appears that they have arrived here already and are at the KAIKOSHA /Army Club/, but KISHI is saying incessantly: 'It is suggested that initial action of some sort toward peace be taken by contacting him /KAO Tsung-wu/. Since no one knows about this, please keep it a secret.' Even though the young officers in the Army do carry out such a task, it is quite impossible to be successful. To begin with CHIANG Kai-shek and practically all of his followers, namely men in influential posts, have been trained in and about Ushigome, and there are none who are not indebted to those like AKIYAMA. Since they have a lengthy background, I think it would be successful and better if those like AKIYAMA would take action instead of these young officers. However, this is a very difficult problem." To me, it sounded as if the argument was going from one extreme to another. KONOYE also stated: "It seems that the Navy is not aware about KAO Tsung-wu. Although I secretly thought that the military was carrying out things which are distressing, nothing can be done about it."

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 280 - (page 2166)

2 July 1938

That evening, I (HARADA) went over to the Navy Minister's and met with the Navy Minister and Vice Minister and the three of us had a leisurely conversation for approximately 2 hours. It was brought out that OKAWA, Shumei recently brought a petition from the young officials of the Foreign Ministry to UGAKI, the Foreign Minister, which stated: "Appoint SHIRATORI the Vice Minister." * * *

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

PART XV

"CABINET RE-SHUFFLE AND CHANGKUFENG"

Chapter 283
Pages 2189-2192
21 July, 1938.

When I met MATSUDAIRA, he said: "Accompanied by Chief of Staff Prince KAN-IN and the Minister of War, I proceeded to the Palace since they desired to make an appeal. The Emperor, thinking that the War Minister had come again to request his sanction concerning the use of force in the negotiation of the problem of the Soviet-Manchukuo border and also thinking that it would cast a reflection on their prestige if they meet him and do not succeed in obtaining his sanction, transmitted the following through the Chief Aide-de-Camp with his deep and sympathetic feeling: 'If you are coming by any chance to obtain my sanction for use of force, I have no such idea in mind. If you are coming for that, you don't have to come'. In spite of this message, the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister said: 'We would still like to request an audience'. So, at 11:00 a.m. the Emperor consented: 'If that is so, have them come.' The Emperor awaited their appearance, but they made the Emperor wait more than an hour after they had arrived at the Palace. The Chief Aide-de-Camp maintained contact between them and finally, close to noon, they were received in audience. Just as the Emperor had thought, the War Minister appealed for the request to use force. The Emperor said: 'Have Ministers who are concerned been contacted?' The War Minister replied: 'Both the Foreign and Navy Ministers have agreed.' Previously, both the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister had expressed their opinions in favor of troop distribution, but they were absolutely against the use of force. The Emperor had already known this and when the War Minister had answered: 'Both Ministers have consented,' the Emperor felt as if he was deceived and with an excited countenance he said: 'The actions of the Army in the past have been abominable. Speaking of the Liutiaokou case in the Manchukuo incident and the doings at the Marco Polo Bridge at the beginning of this incident, there was absolutely no obedience to central orders. There are infrequent instances when the methods used have been arbitrary and sneaky which is altogether improper as my army. I feel that it is abominable in various ways. Nothing like that must happen this time...' And to the War Minister, he admonished: 'Hereafter, you may not move one soldier without my command.' He came out in such a strong tone that the War Minister retreated very humiliated. When the War Minister came back, he said: 'I can never look into the Emperor's face again. I would definitely like to resign.'.....

When I met KIDO later that day, he said: "Why didn't the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal act in concert with the Premier and do something? It is disturbing to have the Emperor taking such pointed actions."

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-KARADA MEMOIRS

PART XVI

"PLANS FOR NEW PARTY SIMMER"

Chapter 291

Pages 2254-5

11 September, 1938

.....KIDO replied: "Yesterday, when KONOYE, you and I met at the Kuwana, I called KONOYE into a separate room and KONOYE talked to me. The gist of what he had to say was that UGAKI showed KONOYE certain documents written by officials of the Foreign Ministry, disapproving the announcement of Jan. 16, and told KONOYE that he agreed with them. This, in other words, was disapproval of the methods of KONOYE and all but said that KONOYE should resign indirectly.... Vice Minister YAMAMOTO ... said: 'The Premier previously told me (YAMAMOTO): 'The announcement of the 16th was a failure'. The Premier declared this to the members of the Cabinet and accordingly, Foreign Minister UGAKI's disapproval of this fact, together with those concerning foreign policy, were shown.

Doc. No. 3150-292-A

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 292 - (pages 2264-65)

22 September 1938

...Concerning the central organ vis a vis China, KIDO likewise said: "UGAKI has some selfish motives and this matter is not progressing very favorably. UGAKI is, after all a very ambitious person and makes things difficult"...

...Then, when I went to KIDO's place recently, he said: "The present Emperor has too much of the scientist in him and has no sympathy for the ideas of the right-wing. It is very troubling because he is too orthodox"....

Loc 3150-292A

西園寺原田日記 百九十二回も、改葬年

それから外交中央機関の問題に就ては、矢張、宇垣に外心がある、其為になか——巧く作かぬ、矢張宇垣は野八家で、困ったものだ、と言ふ話を不意がして居た。……………

……………それから自分は此間不慮の処に行つた時に、どうも今の陛下は斜字者として、其後が多過ぶらうので、右翼の思へ想ひんかに就ての同情がなふ、さうして如何にもオールドリクスで困る……………

Excerpt from SAICHIJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 293-~~9~~ (pages 2273-4)

29 September 1938

...The Premier said, "The situation has become very grave. Moreover, UGAKI says that he wishes to resign. There are a great many newspapermen at my official residence now. Please go to KIDO's home between 4:00 and 5:00 and learn the details from him."

I immediately 'phoned the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and informed him of the fact, and at the same time, upon examining the public situation, /found that/ an extra had already come out, saying "Foreign Minister UGAKI Tenders Resignation."

It so happened that on that evening, I had invited NISHIDA, and KIDO and KONOYE were also to come to my residence for supper. But, because such an incident occurred, KIDO and KONOYE were unable to come to my residence. Since it was said that the business matters of the Central Organ for China had been settled, I thought that it was an odd story. However, ...When I went to KIDO's place, he said, "UGAKI's action is inexcusable. He is very selfish and this present matter is not very good," and, "Since KONOYE likewise following suit says, 'I shall resign,' I reportedly said, 'Do not resign,' and seriously tried to stop him. However, he would not listen, saying, 'I will resign.'"

"This man KONOYE is very strong passively, and I am quite distressed."

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc. 3150-293A

西園寺原田日記

第二百九十三回 小りの披露

總理は、どうも問題が危しくなつて来たので、宇垣が辞めたいと言ふので、今官舎は新聞記者なんかで華山まで来るし、兎に角四時と五時の間に木戸の家に行って、木戸から様子を知りてくれと言ふ事であつた。

それから自分は直ぐ内大臣に電話をかけて、内大臣にその話をすると同時に、兵間の様子を見る、もう既に「宇垣外務大臣は辞表を出した」と云ふ話外でも出て居る。

それから午後其晩は西田先生を招いて晚餐に木戸も近衛も自分も来る事に成つて居た。居た處が、やういふ事が起つたので、木戸も近衛も自分の處に来る事が出来なくなつた。それからどうも事務的には対支中央機關の問題は解決して居ると云ふので、話しな話だと思つて居たが、……

……木戸の處に自分は出かける、木戸は「どうも宇垣は怪しかうへ、あれは私心があつて今度の事も甚だしくない」と言つて、「さうして近衛がやつぱり續いて『辞めよう』と言ふので『辞め

IPS DOC. NO. 3150-295A

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 295 - (page 2285)

4 October 1938

..... HORINOUCHEI, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, came about 1:30 a.m. and said, among other things: "It is a good thing for younger officials of the Foreign Ministry, especially those like the younger brother of USHIBA who returned from Germany, to express their opinions on conditions in the Foreign Ministry to the Premier thru USHIBA. However, they are circulating declaration under joint signatures reading 'Make SHIRATORI Foreign Minister.' Although the section and bureau chiefs realize that they should not at the least allow such actions, there are about ten young members who think 'At all costs SHIRATORI must be made Minister.' These ten are influencing the others with their enthusiasm and are vigorously encouraging them to nominate SHIRATORI. They have handed a signed statement of fifty names to the Premier.

昭和十三年十月七日

陸軍大臣ト西園寺公

第二百九十五回

ヨリノ拔萃

ソレカラ朝十時半頃カラ堀内外 参次官ガ來テイ
ロイロ話シテ居ルノニ「外務省ノ若イ連中、殊ニ
ドイツカラ歸ツテ來タ牛場ノ弟アタリガ、牛場ヲ
通シテ總理ニイロイロ外務省ノ中ノ事情ヲ進言ス
ルノハ好イケレドモ、連判狀ナンカラ作ツテ「白
鳥ヲ外務大臣ニシロ」ト云フコトヲ申出テ居ル。
ソレデ課長ヤ局長ハソンナモノニ毛頭ソンナ策勸
ヲサスベキテナイト云フコトヲ、ヨク承知シテ居
ルンダケレドモ、若イ奴ガ「是非白鳥ヲシナケレ
バナラン」ト云フヤウニ考ヘテ居ル連中ガ十人位
アルケレドモ、其十人ガ熱デ以テ他ノモノヲ引張
ツテ、旺ンニ白鳥ヲ推ス事ヲ奨メテ、結局五十人
位ノ連判狀ヲ總理ノ處ニ出シタ。

Doc. 3150-295A

1. P.S. Doc. No. 3150-313A

Exhibit No.

西園寺原月日記 第三百十三回

ありの授 卒

さういふ内大臣の語に依ると、先日内大臣の処に
参謀次長が来る。頼りに「独逸」の大使に對し
も、外交の大權は陛下にあるから、唯ドゥー、
言ふ、まゝに自介の立場を忘れて同意見なら……
と云つて従つて居るやうな、決定權は日本にあるの
だから、まゝもよく注意して置かぬで、陛下は決
して陛下の外交大權を干犯するやうな事は無
論な。又右翼と云ふものに対して、今う右翼
など、云ふものは全く怪しからぬもので、陸軍は決して
樞子にしない、警言案にも軍費案にもドゥー、遠慮
なくやめと云ふことと言つて居る、と云ふことを参謀
次長は語つて居る。

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 313 (7 February 1939)

ARITA Reports to Throne

P. 2438

"*** The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal then said that the Deputy Chief of Army General Staff came to him a few days ago and said: 'I strictly warned Ambassador OSHIMA (Germany) that the supreme authority of diplomacy is vested in the Emperor. I also cautioned him that it is not desirable to forget one's position and always do as Germany says by saying that he is of the same opinion. Japan has the deciding authority. The Army has thus no intention of infringing upon the diplomatic prerogative of the Emperor. Also, the Army does not pay any attention to the present-day Rightists because they are a most outrageous lot. The civil police and Kempeï have been instructed to take action without hesitation.'"

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 313 (7 February 1939)

ARITA Reports to Throne

P. 2438

" * * * The Army's desire reached the Emperor's ears. Before the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal or anyone else knew, the Emperor personally decided to call the Chief Aide-de-Camp and said: 'Go to the General Staff Headquarters and say that if it is so embarrassing if KONOYE resigns, as a condition for keeping KONOYE in office, decide that question of strengthening the Anti-Comintern pact as decided at the first Five Ministers' Conference. (P. 2430) Moreover, how about eliminating those points advocated by the Army; that is, those points which are in discord with the general decisions made at the Five Ministers' Conference? Also, how about deciding to have this anti-Comintern pact directed strictly against the Soviet as it had been decided at the Five Ministers' Conference?' The Emperor had, as his idea, the foregoing transmitted to the Army, who, however, did not show any signs of submitting to the Imperial will and said: 'We are not in favor of that.'"

I.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-313B

Exhibit No.

如園寺原田日記 第三百十三回

よりの収容

「よりの陸軍の希望が天聴にまで達した。其処で陛下は内大臣も誰も知らずに、陛下即自に外、市考、侍従武官長を呼ばれて、
「矢張本部に行こうと言へんをに近衛總理の辭あるが困るのなら、近衛總理を引止めて代りに例の防共強化の問題を、最初、五相會議で決定した通り、に決まて、さうして今日陸軍が主張して居る。謂はば五相會議の全般と喰違ふ、あつた兵を取りやめ、さういふ、五相會議の決定通り、純然たる、防共、トウサ、に対する防共協定と云ふことにしてはどうか、
と云ふ意味のことと、陛下の市考で陸軍に対して傳へし、さういふけれども、陸軍は、「それは困ります」と言つて陛下の思召に従はうとしなかつた。

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 324 - (pages 2514-5)

9 May 1939

* * * * *

Early on the morning of the 6th, I went to ARITA's residence in Mejiro and he said: "Yesterday, just after I handed the Premier's message to the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, I received an official wire from Councillor USAMI in Berlin, which said that he /USAMI/ was requested by Gauss, the Deputy Vice-Minister of the German Foreign Office to meet him. He /Gauss/ asked if Japan wouldn't agree to a proposal such as this, and added that as this had not been shown to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop yet, he /Gauss/ did not know what the Foreign Minister would have to say about it, but he /Gauss/ was showing this to him /USAMI/, unofficially, as his private plan. Upon looking through the draft, though it was written in a very indirect fashion, emphasis was put on the German demands previously refused by Japan, which after all was a draft then including those demands. Then ARITA said, "I have investigated the origin of this draft and it somehow seems that it was submitted by the Japanese Army to the German Foreign Office through the attaches. This is outrageous and I won't be responsible if this sort of the conspiracy goes on." However, he /ARITA/ did not show me /HARADA/ the actual contents of the draft.

* * * * *

Extra

183. Doc. No. 150-324A

Exhibit no.

明治三十二年四月一日

それから六日の朝早く田舎の奥の家に於て話を聞
くと「先日総領の又方から、自今が東京駐留、独り
両大吏に渡一、二人遣ふ、と云ふ事、我々が佐
美参事官から公言するに、外務省、外務
次官補、ガクと云ふ人、本より、本より、
行つて居る、前々から、本より、本より、
やういふ、本より、本より、外務大臣に、
やういふ、外務大臣に、何と云ふ、
川と云ふ、自今、本より、本より、
たつと、総領、本より、本より、
個々に、本より、本より、
莫に、本より、本より、
で、有、外務大臣、本より、本より、
べと見ると、本より、本より、
して、外務省、本より、本より、
から、本より、本より、
ゆと、本より、本より、
と言つて居る、本より、本より、
春は、本より、本より、

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 324 - (9 May 1939)

/T.N. This excerpt begins where IPS Doc. No. 3150-324A ends./

P. 2515

After this, without any relation to the Premier's message, there was a wire from Ambassador OSHIMA. It mentioned that 2 or 3 days ago that Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP called up Ambassador OSHIMA at Berlin from Munich on his way to meet CIANO at Como, and questioned OSHIMA: "When a contracting nation goes to war against a third nation, and even if there is no military aid from Japan (Germany and Italy do not expect military aid from Japan. It is impossible for Japan to do so), would it be permissible to recognize Japan as being in a state of war?" OSHIMA had replied in the affirmative.

Regarding this, ARITA said that it is indeed inexcusable for those abroad to propose, on their own authority, such a thing as "participation in war" and to make such an arbitrary reply. A Five Ministers Conference is scheduled for tomorrow, but this matter will be of considerable difficulty, for Premier HIRANUMA is inclined to assume a supporting attitude rather than remain neutral. I believe that such matters have already been transmitted abroad by the Army, and if such is the case, I cannot assume the responsibility for our foreign policy."

I returned home and called the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and told him of it. On the 7th, I went to Yokohama with MATSUDAIRA for dinner. In the midst of our dinner, the Foreign Minister called me and said: "I would like to see you as soon as possible." Together with MATSUDAIRA, I visited the Foreign Minister from 9:00 p.m. and asked the result of the Five Ministers' Conference. As we had expected, the Premier supported the opinion of the War Minister, and upheld OSHIMA's answer to RIBBENTROP, that in the event of war between one of the contracting nations and a third nation, Japan will be considered to have entered a state of war, although it will not give any military support.

IPS Doc. No. 3150 - 324C

Exhibit No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 324 - (page 2517)

8 May 1939

"Overseas Affairs Minister KOISO wanted to see me so I met him on the night of the 8th at my relative's house. We talked from about 8:30 to about 11:00 and first of all KOISO said: 'The solution of the China Problem, which is so often mentioned by the Army; namely, the reaching of the conclusion of the war as soon as possible; will be impossible without a tri-partite alliance. Because the officers and men at the front are displeased with British and French aid to Chiang Kai-shek, an alliance with Germany and Italy will alleviate their feelings somewhat. It would then be in order to settle the China Problem through the offices of England and France. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult to pacify the officers and men at the front.'"

J.P.S. doc. No. 3150-324C

Exhibit No.

西園寺原田日記第三二四回よりの抜萃

昭和十四年五月八日

小磯 昭和十四年五月八日。と云ふ話であつたから
八日の晩自分の親戚の家で八時半頃から十一時頃
までいろいろ話して見ると、小磯大將は先づ第一に
よく陸軍の言ふ二の対支問題、打倒、即ち戦争、
を早く終局に導く爲には、曰独伊の同盟が出来な
ければ駄目だ、戦線の將士は英佛の將士を援
助と云ふことに非常中な不満を持って居るが、之と
も独伊と一緒になつてやうだ、と云ふこと、多少その気
持が緩和される、然る後に英佛を使つて支那の問題
を解決するとはよいけれども、それなると前線の將
士がなかく（きかぬ）。

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

"Army Reduction and Prince SAIONJI"

Chapter 325 - (16 May 1939)

P. 2523

Concerning the results of the Five Ministers' Conference of the 9th, the Navy Vice-Minister said: "The conference was opened at 2:00 p.m. First of all, the Navy Minister said. 'The Gauss draft which we have here, did not come through legitimate channels. If we are to follow the proper course, making this a problem for the Five Ministers Conference; in the first place, we have not even received an official reply from Germany to the message of the Premier. Notwithstanding the fact that to demand for an answer reply is our first problem, don't you think it very odd to attach ourselves to the Gauss draft without demanding for this reply. However, no one said anything about it and again continued discussing the Gauss draft. The Premier, in his remark, gave me the impression that a reply to his message was unnecessary because the matter had already been solved when Ambassador OSHIMA had replied "yes" when Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had asked him whether it was all right to consider Japan a participant /in the event of war/. In other words, it was agreeable for Japan to be considered as ready to participate in the event of war between England-France and Germany-Italy. * * * "

Extra

西園寺原田日記第三二回分 拔萃

L. P. S. Doc. No. 3150-325A

……それから九日の五相会議の様子は海軍大臣
が聞くと、「五相会議は午後三時から開かれて海軍大臣
は先づその、此処におて居るガウス安は、これは本
筋の事では無いぢやありませんか。五相会議の問題と
して、お話を述べるならば、第一總理大臣のメーデー
に對する、この返事が未だどうもつかぬやうなところ
ないか、此の返答を催促する、これが第一の問題
であるにも拘らず、此の催促もして、斯の如く他のガウス
安本に彼を執着して居る、これは訝しな話じやあな
か、と申されたけれども、誰も何も言はなくて再び又
ガウス安本に就て彼を執着して居た。で總理は自分
のメーデーに對する、この返事は要らない、と
既に大島大使がリッペン外務大臣から交戦状態
に入る、と見て好い、と言われた時に、然しと答へた
で、凡そ解決して居る結局歐羅巴に於て英佛
と独伊が開戦した場合に、日本は直ちに交戦
状態に入る、と認めた、と見て、いや、な、い、ゆ、であつた。

Exhibit No.

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 326 - (23 May 1939)

HIRANUMA Backs OSHIMA

P. 2535

Early on the morning of the 23rd I called Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO to the phone in order to learn what the latest developments were. According to what Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO said he understood that both Ambassadors, i.e. SHIRATORI and OSHIMA said that nothing could be done about that particular draft and they kicked it back. He went on to say that at the same time the Army claimed that there were some words missing /T.N. presumably in the draft/ therefore he /YAMAMOTO/ thought that /the whole business/ was scandalous.

Later I talked over the phone with Foreign Minister ARITA. He said: 'I discussed the matter at the Foreign Ministry last night. It fell back on their /T.N. Germany, Italy/ demands to enter the war. The Army's contention that words were missing meant a clear-cut expression of participation in war and I cannot agree with them. Yesterday, I sent the Vice-Minister to the Premier /T.N. to ask his opinion/, but he says that it should be done the way the Army wants. It appears as if he too wishes to have it read 'participation in war'.'

Then, I talked over the phone with the Navy Minister. He was very enraged and said: "It is outrageous even to mention matters such as participation in war or condition of war. In spite of the fact that the Emperor often says, 'I shall not permit it,' to the General Staff Headquarters, the War Minister and the Premier, concerning participation in war, it is very abominable for the Premier to support the Army and the Ambassadors who take action contrary to the will of the Emperor."

Ex. 3803-13

J.P.S Doc No. 3150-326A

Exhibit No.

西園寺厚田日記 第三二六回からの抜粋

それから廿三日の朝早く山本大臣に電話して
後の様子を見かねて呼ぶに「彼が山本大臣
の言ふのは何も兩大使、即ち自衛大臣から
あるまでは取捨がないといふこと既に決まるといふ話
であった同時に陸軍から文相の口から又か
るといふことまで流れるので甚だ怪しからうと思つ
て居るといふ話であった。それから有田外務大臣に
電話を掛くと大張り口もいろいろ外務省
の相談に於て陸軍の要求は参戦といふ
ことに同意するが陸軍からいふと文相の
口からは参戦を拒否するといふ
いふことなので自分は中にも同意は出来な
い。昨日山本を首相の父に傳へに付たけれども
總理は陸軍の要求通りには行かないや
ないかといふのでこれも大張り口を二つにし
たといふ事持らう。それから海軍大臣と
電話を掛くと海軍大臣は非常に憤慨し
参戦が交戦状態に入るといふたにあら甚だ
怪しからうし陛下は度々参謀本部にも海軍
大臣にも總理にも参戦といふことになつて許さ
ないといふ所があるに拘らず。それと反対の行動を
執る大連海軍を擁護する總理の態度
は非常に怪しからうといふ憤慨して
居た。

Doc 3150-329A

西園寺原田日記

一九三九年(昭和十四年)六月十五日ヨリ

沿革 二五三ヨリ二五五其後

二五三頁

それから数日前近衛から「陸軍や外務省の電報等を集めて見て居るけれどもどうも昭和十三年八月二十九日發電の陸軍の電報二百三十五號即ち陸海軍次官發大島小島西武官宛のもの及び同日發電の陸軍次官から大島宛寫しの陸軍二百三十五號に関する説明、この邊から大分間違の基になつたんぢやあなかつたか」と思はれるから電報を貰つてくれなかつたかと云ふ話であつた。

其處で自分は海軍の高木大佐に頼んで早速電報を揃へて見た。其時に高木大佐は

「昨日御内話の件、同封候條然るべく御配慮下度候

尤も本電内容は五相會議の決定と事務當局の解釋との違ひ並に陸軍主張の轉向等を示唆するものとして事務省側の嚴に他見を嫌忌致し居候處に有之。此点殊にくれぐれも御諒察の上御用済後御返附方高配賜り度と書いてあつた。

で左の電文は即ち

陸電二三五號

一笠原少將持参ノ協定案ニ對シテハ陸海軍共其ノ趣旨ニ同意ナリ。左ノ條件ヲ以テ之ヲ採擇スルコトニ意見ノ致ラ見ク
前文トシテ左記要旨ヲ附加ス

Doc 3150-327A

前文案略

- （四） 第三條「外交的」ヲ「經濟的」ニ改ム
- （ハ） 第三條末尾「ヲ行フ義務アルモノトス」ヲ「付キ直チニ協議ニ入ル」ニ改ム
- （ニ） 第三條第三條「脅威及攻撃ナル字句」ヲ「挑發ニヨリガル」ヲ冠ス
- （ホ） 本協定ニ附屬スル秘密協定ヨリ與ヘキ兵力的援助條件範圍限度及實行方法ヲ明確且詳細ニ規定シ度キ意見ナリ

ニ 當方、本協定ヲナルベク速ニ締結スルノ希望ヲ有スルニ付、獨側ヨリ速ニ正式ニ提案セシムル如ク取計ハレ度

陸電三三六號ニ関スル説明

一 前文案「本協定」カ現存防共協定、延長ニシテ主トシテ蘇聯ヲ目標トスル趣旨ヲ明確ニラシメントシタル案ニシテ英米等ヲ正面ニ敵トスルガ如キ印象ヲ與ヘサル採用語上ニ注意セラルモノナリ

ニ 本文案第三條「武力的援助」義務ヲ速時且無條件ニシマス我々、意ニ及ビ純然タル歐洲問題ニ捲キ込マルルヤ否危険ヲカラシムル爲メ兵力的援助ニ入ルニ先キ協議ヲ行フヲ建前トシタルモノナリ

三 本協定趣旨ニ於テ防禦的性質ヲ有セシムル爲メ脅威及攻撃ノ挑發ニ依ラサル場合ニ限ルコトトセリ

四 尙ホ定本文ニ関シテ、且下更ニ鋭意研究中ナリ

No. 2

Doc 3150-330A

外務大臣も通して申し上げてこれと云ふことである。
で内大臣は此由を陛下に上奉し、と云ふが陛下
「は」自合の耳にはどうして、犯人引渡した後、
その誠意を認めて解決すると云ふは、と
言つてやうに聞かして、目的達成とは聞かぬ、と
云ふ中言葉であり、又陸軍大臣は総理や
外務大臣には矢張り従つて通りがなり強い
議論を言つて居る。

ニ五六頁

で目的達成と云ふことの内容は何、と云ふ
ことにすると、二つの重点がある。一点は治安維
持に協力せよ、と云ふことであり、他の一点は軍隊
の生存の爲の必要條件である。

で陛下は内大臣に

「どうして斯の如く間違つてゐては面白くない、

兎に角総理を呼んで言はせよ、

と仰せられたが、内大臣は「直ぐ総理を呼ぶ

にしよう」とは却つて用が立ちますから、今一度

参謀総長官を呼ぶし、と云つてお確かにな

ることは適當なはります」と申し上げた云々が、

「それでは総長官を呼ばし

と仰るで、参謀総長官が参内した、

No. 3

Doc 3150-330A

No. 4

で、此時従長官は

「昨日は~~貴方~~の言葉が重なりすぎて、
どうもさう押足を致しませう」

と仰せられて、書いじりの持参主の、で中、

方の目的達成も企圖し居る内容が
あり、即ち方の二点と彼に従う五ヶ條

ある。これは大体新聞に書かれて居る。

例へば工務司に憲兵を入れる。それが工務

司は日本と協力して治安に仕する、尚ほ

五ヶ條の準備金も引渡す、と云ふやうな事

であつて。

で陛下は従長官に對して

「経済問題が含まれて居る、

と云ふ陛下問であつたが、従長官は

「含まれて居りません」

で陛下は再度お確かめになつて、従長官

「含まれて居りませんが閣下はご承知です」

と奉答して居られる。此處で陛下は尚

ほ

「経済問題は切り離して、政府の問題と

して取扱ふ、と政府が去つて居る、それ

で、

と云ふ陛下問であり

No. 3150-330A

No. 5

五三九頁

然長官は

「それで宜うしうにぞあるぞ」

と奉答せられた。然が陛下は直ちに

「その意見は陸相も承知か」

と仰せられた。然が必長官は

「それは存じません」

と云ふことであつた。

で総理は十日に参内して内大臣に会

の折に、陸軍大臣は會論怪府問題

を言明して居る。と言つて居り、又侍從武

官長もこの二つを矣——参謀總長官と陸

軍大臣、言ふ處違ふ、と云ふやうな二つ

就ては、頗るこれは困つたことだ、と言つ

て居る。

EXCERPTS FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 332
(11 July 1939)Emperor Berates ITAGAKI

P. 2569

"In regard to the Tientsin problem, generally speaking, the Premier agrees with the views of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, although they wish to make firm restrictions from the 1st of July, the Central Government has no control. Therefore, the units abroad do as they wish and this situation is very troublesome. The strong argument by the Consul in Tientsin and the comparatively strong attitude taken by Minister KATO, is somewhat regrettable. At any rate, that is the situation. The points in the Tientsin problem which Japan is considering are: first, the placing of Japanese in the Industrial Bureau; second, the placing of Kempeitai within the concessions; third, the demand of handing over of 45,000,000 Yuan of legal tender to the provisional government as a friendly gesture; fourth, cooperation to preserve peace and order; and fifth, the handing over of the criminals. The stupidity of the War Minister seems to be the cause for all the problems becoming extremely disorderly.

P. 2574

"Furthermore, when the Emperor asked about the Tientsin Incident, the War Minister said: 'The reason why the Army requested the surrender of the 45,000,000 Yuan in the British Concession was to maintain the currency exchange.' The Emperor asked: 'Is that sufficient?' The War Minister said: 'No, it isn't!' The Emperor was shocked and said: 'That is very bad thinking on your part,' and rebuked him. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: 'The Army is confused and everything is lost.' He considered it a tragedy and even lamented to the extent that the Army was going to destroy the nation."

西園寺・原田日記

一九三九年／昭和十四年／七月十一日（月）の夜草

二五九頁より二五七頁其他

二五九頁

それから尚ほ次に天津問題に就ては、大体に於て総理は外務大臣の言ふことに賛同してゐる。七月一日から検査を非常に強硬にすると言ふことが、要するに中央の統制がとれて居ない爲に、金先が勝手なことをして困る天津領事あたりの強硬な辭又加藤公使等が比較的強硬な態度を執つて居ることに就ては

二五七頁

多少遺憾に堪えなげいかも、兎に角さうな情況である。兎に角第一は工部局に日本人を入小まと言ふこと、第二は憲兵を租界内に入小まこと、第三は好意的に考へるやうに法幣及現在の有金四千五百萬元を臨時政府に渡せと言ふこと、四が治安維持に協力すること、五が犯人の引渡しと言ふのが天津問題について大体日本側が考へて居ることだ、と言つて居る。

陸軍大臣が低頭する爲に、これが原因になつて凡ての問題が紛糾を極めるやうである。……

I.R.S. Doc. No. 3150-3324

p. 2

尚續いて天津問題なんかに就ては御下向があつても好
して。

三十五頁

「陸軍は英租界がらいてはる四千五百萬元の引渡しも
要するものは結局其の相場を維持する爲でござ
います」と申し上りて、陛下は

「それだけではないか」

と御下向になつたら「とてもそれは駄目なんだから
います」と奉答して、陛下は又敬重なまゝに

「ふつと頭が悪くないやあないか」

と言つて立ちめう水と、と女中様を話して、内
臣は「如何にもいふ陸軍は乱脈で、いつまで経て
と言つて非難して要するに國を亡ぼすものが、今日
陸軍をやあは、と女中様に飲みて居る
尚陛下は昨日平沼首相に対して × × × × ×

Excerpt From SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 332 - (11 July 1939)

Emperor Berates ITAGAKI

* * * * *

P. 2574.

"When I /T.N. HARADA/ met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on the 7th, he was talking about the Emperor and the War Minister. He said: 'The War Minister suddenly went to the Imperial Palace and spoke about Gen. TERAUCHI being sent to the Nazi Party Conference. Although the Navy was planning to send Admiral OSUMI at that time, there was no actual formal notice yet from the other /T.N. German/ government, and since this is still confidential, it hasn't been reported to the Emperor, nor has the Navy reported anything concerning this matter. The Emperor already knew that at the conference of the Supreme War Councillors, the War Minister reported that Foreign Minister ARITA favored the Military Alliance and he /T.N. Emperor/ thought it very distressing.

"Furthermore, in regard to the sending of Gen. TERAUCHI, the War Minister stated to the Emperor that it is necessary to send Gen. TERAUCHI even for the reason of strongly binding the Anti-Comintern Pact spiritually. The Emperor did not think it very good and said: 'You /T.N. War Minister/ know my opinions well. Even before, at the conference of the Supreme War Councillors, you reported an actual falsity that the Foreign Minister was in favor of the Military Alliance. That is very insolent.'"

Ex. 3804-B

I. P. S. Doc. No. 315C-332B

Exhibit No.

西園寺原田日記 第三百三十三回ヨリ、收筆

9

それから七日に内大臣に会つたが、又陛下と陸軍大臣との話を一と居られ、陸軍大臣は突然参内して寺内大將のチヤス大会衆遣の件に就て申上げた。其時に海軍は大角大將を必ずしうに居るけれども、然し未だ實際向ふ政府から正式に言つて来なかつた。が、未だ内々の話である。だから随分内憂もなれば、無論海軍からは一切其件に就ては申上げてない。豫て陸軍大臣が軍務参議官の会議で、有田外務大臣は軍と同盟に賛成である、と報告したことを陛下は既に御承知であつて、非常の不愉快に御思ひなつて居られた。

で、尚ほ寺内大將の衆遣の事に就て、陸軍大臣は防共強化も精神的に強く結合する意味に於ても、寺内大將の衆遣は必要である、と云ふことを申上げたので、陛下は非常に面白くお愛ひにならう。

「此例は自前の考案よく知つてゐるにやないか。此例も軍務参議官の会議で、外務大臣は軍との協定に賛成である、と云ふ虚構なる手段を御用ひして居る。誠に怪しみの話じゃなうか。」

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 333 - (page 2578)

11 July 1939

When I (HARADA) came back on the 11th, the anti-British movement had steadily become powerful. Although there were many billboards posted from before, these were increased and the anti-British demonstrations which seemed too blunt became severe. Since the Anglo-Japanese Conference is to take place in Tokyo on the 15th, they (anti-British demonstrations) have spread to various areas with the intent to check (the English), and for other reasons.

I (HARADA) asked KIDO: "Why are the demonstrations so strong?" KIDO said: "Since the Kempeitai leads them and the Army finances them (anti-British demonstrations), we can't do anything about it." There are even rumours that the Police Bureau (Home Ministry) are issuing instructions that it is permissible to have demonstrations if done in a legal way and things are very noisy.....

..... On the 13th when I (HARADA) met KIDO, he said: "The other day, KOISO was saying this and that about the billboards and speeches, so I told him that it is not necessary to worry about such things."

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 333 - (page 2578)

11 July 1939

When I (HARADA) came back on the 11th, the anti-British movement had steadily become powerful. Although there were many billboards posted from before, these were increased and the anti-British demonstrations which seemed too blunt became severe. Since the Anglo-Japanese Conference is to take place in Tokyo on the 15th, they (anti-British demonstrations) have spread to various areas with the intent to check (the English), and for other reasons.

I (HARADA) asked KIDO: "Why are the demonstrations so strong?" KIDO said: "Since the Kempeitai leads them and the Army finances them (anti-British demonstrations), we can't do anything about it." There are even rumours that the Police Bureau (Home Ministry) are issuing instructions that it is permissible to have demonstrations if done in a legal way and things are very noisy.....

..... On the 13th when I (HARADA) met KIDO, he said: "The other day, KOISO was saying this and that about the billboards and speeches, so I told him that it is not necessary to worry about such things."

I.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-333A

……それから十一日に帰って来ると、併走運動に参り、
 へになて、連看板も随分前がうあつたけれど、通るた
 り露見すると思はれる程度に、反表示威運動と見
 るべきものか。で、結局日更表示會談が十一日か
 ら始まることゝなつた。牽制する意味に於て、或はあ
 いうな意味で、各地方にまで、それが響き、居る。で、
 本戸をんなに「何故あんなにひどいんだ」と言ふと、「実は
 憲兵が先に立つて陸軍が金とよゝするんで、その箇
 が立たない。それで聞く處に依ると、警告保身めなり
 ら、合法的にやるんならうとて思ふ」と云ふ意味の
 指令が行つてゐる、と云ふ噂も、立つて不分明なつた。

* * *

十三日に本戸に会つた處が、「実は昨日も、磯が
 連看板で演説會なんかに、一氣で……」言
 へ居るから、あんまりはどうでも好い。で、
 せんじに云にする必要はない、と言つて下つた。と
 本戸が言つて居る。

Exhibit No.

IPS DOC. NO. 3150-333 B

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

PART XX

BRITAIN AND THE TIENTSIN PROBLEM

Chapter 333
Page 2578
11 July 1939

When I (H. RADA) came home on the 11th, anti-British activities had steadily increased. Although there were many billboards posted from before, these were increased and the anti-British demonstrations have become quite severe. Since the Anglo-Japanese Conference is to take place in Tokyo on the 15th with the intent to check (the English) and for other reasons, they (anti-British demonstrations) have spread to various areas.

I (H. RADA) asked KIDO: "Why are the demonstrations so strong?" KIDO said: "Since the Kempeï leads them and the Army finances them (anti-British demonstrations), we can't do anything about it." There are even rumours that the Police Bureau (Home Ministry) issue orders that it is permissible to have demonstrations if done in a legal way

On the 13th when I (H. RADA) met KIDO, he said: "The other day, KOISO was saying this and that about the billboards and speeches, so I told him not to worry about such things."

Doc 3150-334A

西園寺、原田、日記

一九三九年(昭和十四年)七月二十五日ヨリ、披露

二五八頁

それから十九日に有田外務大臣と電話で話した処が、「昨日閣議後で、五相会議に陸軍大臣からソグモエト
問題、即ちモロの國境問題に就て、現在交戦中だけれどもこれを外交に移して貰ひたい。さうしてそれは非常に急務を要する」と云うことも頻りに懇通され、さうして此点から考へても日独伊の軍事同盟は絶対に必要であるから、促進して貰ひたい」と云う要求があらんで海軍大臣は終始黙して居ったが、大藏大臣、それから自衛隊も此事柄とその事柄とは全然別であると言つて取り合ななから、後で聞くと海軍大臣も更に強々反対の意見を持て居るんやうに見えん、と言つて居るんで、よ本大臣も音西相も、陸軍の申込を軍部同盟に依するにすれば、内閣は結局倒れるより他にない」と云うことも言つて居るん。

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 334 - (25 July 1939)

P. 2588

- - - - -

On the 23rd, MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and I /HARADA/ went to the home of Foreign Minister ARITA and we conversed on various matters for three or four hours as we lunched. ARITA said: "When KONOYE met the War Minister the other day, the War Minister asked KONOYE if it wasn't possible to change the Emperor's mind in regard to this military agreement, and KONOYE replied that it was very difficult."

- - - - -

IPS Doc. No. 3150-334B

Exhibit No. 3805A

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 334 - (25 July 1939)

P. 2588

- - - - -

On the 23rd, MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and I /HARADA/ went to the home of Foreign Minister ARITA and we conversed on various matters for three or four hours as we lunched. ARITA said: "When KONOYE met the War Minister the other day, the War Minister asked KONOYE if it wasn't possible to change the Emperor's mind in regard to this military agreement, and KONOYE replied that it was very difficult."

- - - - -

Exhibit No.

I.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-3344B

西園寺原田日記第三百三十四回

よしの技 華

き水あう廿三日に有田外務大臣の家へ松平内
大臣秘書官長と一語に行つて、午餐を共にし乍ら二
四時間、ろくろ一話した。で、有田の語に依ると云
日近衛外陸軍大臣に会つた時に、陸軍大臣は、此軍
事協定の問題に就ては、陛下うゝ考を何とか変へる
訳には行かぬ、かと云ふことを近衛に申したのを、
近衛は、それは中々難しいだろう、と云ふ事を、
と云ふ話であつた。

Extra

Doc. No. 3150 - 335A

Exh. No. 3806-11

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 335 - (Page 2597)

EJ
21/19

3 August 1939

. Education Minister ARAKI said, "I am not too worried about the Rightists. If we act resolutely, they can be swayed. But the important question is, how the situation within the Army will develop and how to gradually take control of this." Next, he said, "I know quite a bit about KOISO, the Minister of Overseas Affairs. His shortcoming is that he is a man of intrigue and trickery. For instance, when the problem of legal tender arose at the recent Cabinet meeting, he boldly suggested that counterfeit currency be used. This is very distressing. There are instances when he sent the Kempei to China and Manchuria dressed in work clothes. However, at a time when Japan is trying to strive for the new order based on virtue, these acts are contradictory and I think it is extremely harmful. KOISO is a person who has power and enthusiasm, but he has not set opinions and deals only in intrigues and trickery. He is a man who can easily be swayed." It is a matter of course that he did not speak favorably about KOISO, but on the contrary, he spoke very ill of him. Therefore, although KONOYE often proposed to unit ARAKI and KOISO, I felt it utterly futile.

Excerpt From SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
Chapter 336 - (14 August 1939)

P. 2598

"And at noon on the 3rd, I (HARADA) heard much on various topics over lunch from Captain TAKAGI of the Navy, who said: - - - - -

"- - -" When Captain ENDO, Naval attache in Berlin explained the position of the Japanese Navy with regard to the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern /Pact/ between Japan, Germany and Italy to the Chief Secretary of the German Navy Ministry, who said that he was in complete sympathy, stating his opinion, that if war should finally break out between Germany-Italy and England-France, he thought it sufficient if Japan would only maintain a benevolent neutrality. When some time later ENDO told this to OSHIMA, OSHIMA, so goes the story, got very angry and asked indignantly of Ribbentrop through his secretary Stahmer, saying "Does the Foreign Minister also concur?"

Exhibit No.

J.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-336A

西園寺原田日記第三三六回分の抜粋

それから三日の晝に海軍の高木大佐と一緒に食事をして
作らうという話を聞いたが、高木大佐は「……
……ベルリン駐劄の海軍のアタチニ」である遠藤大佐
が、ドイツの海軍省の官房長に日本海軍の日独伊所共
強他に対する主張を説明した處が、全然同感である、と
言つて意見を述べて居たが、結局独伊、英佛の間に
戦争の起つた場合は、日本としては好音の的中をこく
れ、はもとよりだと思ふ、と言つて居たので、暫くして
此事を遠藤から大島に話すと、大島は非常に怒つて、ス
ターと云ふ口癖の録書を遣らして、リッペンに「外務大
臣も承知なのか」と言つて怒つて、と云ふ話がある。

3807A

IPS Doc. No. 3150-336B

Exhibit No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-MARADA MEMOIRS
Chapter 336 - (14 August 1939)

P. 2603

"Furthermore, the /Foreign/ Minister talked about the details of the Five Ministers' Conference of the 8th: --'The Premier, to begin with, stood up and said, "Yesterday the War Minister visited me and explained the Army proposal. We have been making efforts along the pre-arranged plan simply because we have recognized the necessity of a treaty. Then /yesterday/ the War Minister said that this proposal did not deviate from the pre-arranged plan, but I, for my part, could not think so. If any of you members of the Cabinet have anything to ask, please ask questions as much as you like." These introductory remarks of the Premier were followed by various questions from the Cabinet members. To sum up, the Army's contention was that a change in the situation necessitated an offensive and defensive alliance; as the first step, however, the pre-arranged plan was to be followed; in case this could not be done, the second step was to be taken, that is to say, an offensive and defensive alliance was to be concluded. The Premier then asked the War Minister what on earth the latter himself thought. The War Minister replied to the effect that he was a State Minister on the one hand and at the same time the War Minister on the other and that it was quite true that he, as a State Minister, consented to the pre-arranged plan being followed but, as a representative of the general opinion of the Army, he consented also to the second step being taken.' Then, he said that in his (the Foreign Minister's) opinion, it appeared that either there was still some leeway on the unconditional alliance or that ITAGAKI would be ousted."

008 Mr M 3/50-221B

Mr M

西園寺原田日記第三三二頁より抄す。

尚ほ大臣は八日の五相會議の模様を語つて居たが、總理は立つて、昨日陸軍大臣が來りて陸軍
案に對して説明をして行かれたが、協定の必要に就ては
自命もそれを認めて來たから、既定方針に依つて行か
るべきだ。と云ふ。陸軍大臣は、此案は既定方針を歪め
たものでは、と言はれるが、自命にはさうは思へなかつた。
どうも各閣僚から質すべきものがある、元命質して貰ふ
たい、と言ふ總理の前置きで、それから各閣僚からいろいろ
質問があり、結局陸軍の主張は、情勢が変化は攻守同
盟を必要とする、然し第一段として既定方針を行く、さうして
二段が出た場合は第二段を行く、即ち攻守同盟を結
ぶと云ふことになつた。で、總理は陸軍大臣に對して、一体陸
軍大臣自身はどう思ふか、と言ふことを聞いたが、陸軍
大臣は、自命は一面に於て國務大臣であると同時に、他面に
於ては陸軍大臣である、で、既定方針を行くと言ふことは、就
ては自命は國務大臣として無論賛成であるけれども、然
し一面陸軍の總意を代表する意味に於て、第二段を行く
と云ふことにも自命は賛成である、と云ふことであつた。と云ふ
どうも自命(外相)の思ふには無條件同盟には多少餘
裕があるやうに見える、或は板垣の追ふかとも考へらる、
と言ふことを言つて居た。

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 336 - (pages 2607-8)

12 August 1939

Then after returning from a trip through Hakone, I visited Home Affairs Minister KIDO on the morning of the 12th. /He/ said, "When I met KONO last night he said that although he believed that ARAKI would also suffice for the succeeding Cabinet, would it not be better to have HIROTA; that when he /KIDO/ met HIROTA the other day, his opinions were very similar to those of the Army; that therefore, since HIROTA is optimistic and acts intelligently he should do. It is beside the point whether HIROTA, in the end, would accept or not. To tell the truth, I have not met HIROTA yet."

Exhibit No.

5-5 拔萃

と、P.S. ...それから自分は六田根を置いて歸つて、十二日は
朝木と内務大臣を訪ねる。昨日、近衛と会つた。
近衛は、いつも後継内閣は芒川本位だといふが、芒
田の方がよいではないかと六田に説明会つて見ると、餘り
その意見が陸軍に近いたから、六田なら常観してしま
う。又、方々を考へて居るから行けや、といふ。かゝ
りとも言つて居た。但し、六田が来つてはけるか受ける
かは別だ。隨つて自分は六田にも実はまだ会つて
居ない。...

Doc. 3150-337-A

No. 1

西園寺原田日記

一九三九年／昭和十四年／八月二十三日ヨリ、抜萃

二六〇・一 二六二六

二六〇。頁

それから~~身~~は有田外務大臣に会つたが、金曜日
即ち廿五日には五相会議を開くことが出来るだろう
が、外務省の案は陸軍と非常に距離があるから
これでは必ず衝突するであろう。で書記官長も悲觀
的に見て居つた。一時うやうに樂觀は許さぬ。表面
は少しも変らなくても事實に於て變つて来る危険
がありませんか」と、外務大臣は疑つて居つた。

Doc 3150-337-A

三六二頁

若し陸軍大臣が単独辞職の場合には、彼位陸相も得ることは困難であらう。此時は優待を賜ふやうに、と言ふやうな工作もやはり元老重臣でやうて居るとか、軍事同盟策に就て平沼総理は上奏御裁可も経たざる基本案より一歩も出づることと得ずと、それが又面白くないとか、外務省案を以て五相会議を開催する時は、陸軍の反響を以て、会議は成るべく速進して陸軍の空気を乗ける間に次の工作として、本工作完成の曉に於て重大なる決意をする、と言ふやうに極めて自分勝手なことも方々に言ひふらして居つて、何と不都合な話であつたとしても、如何にも誠しやかに現内閣と重臣元老とのことと言つて居るから、自分は坂本氏に手紙で、虚構な事実と云ふふうするは断然怪しからなければ、それより根本は、苟も陛下の御心裁を経た五相会議の決定には、

三六三頁

陸軍大臣も無論加つて居る、それにも可なり、それも覆へる所謂日独伊の軍事同盟を促進によつて、と言ふやうに極めて独断的な、又或る意味から言へば大義名分を辨へないやうなやり方を就ては、根本問題として考へなければならぬ、と言ふことと述べて、唯かに重臣元老方面と現内閣が何等かうな関係のないことを書いて送つて置いた。

No. 2

其後、一日に葉山に行つて内大臣に会つて様子を聞くと、今朝九時に総理が葉山に来て拜謁し、其後自分は総理に會つた處が、総理は何と云つて日英會談を出かしたか、陸軍で従つた横車を押して、この成立を和同するやうな風で詢に回す。併下つ尚ほ一縷の望を持つて居る。随つて外交上今日日本立場を考へると、極め、絶好のチャンスでその時に斯の如くやれ、軍事同盟の何のと云ふことでゴタくすることは、實に惜しいと言つて居た。で、今でも陸軍大臣に就て自分は相當にその人となり、ト就ては信頼して居たが、此頃、態度を見ると如何にも訝しい、いふも頭腦の無いばかりではな、と言つて、陸軍大臣に対して非常に不満を持つて居た。さうして「今日の陸軍だつて、凡そがあつた風に分うな、いふはなかつて、僅かり人間が左右して居るであつて、凡そが感情で、さうしてそれが勝ち負けばかりで、陸軍の言ひ出したことが通らな、と負けたと云ふ感じをもつて非常に憤慨して来る、で、こんなことでは恐らく大局を誤りがちであるから」

三六—三頁

詢に心配である……

Doc. 3150-337A

No. 4

陛下は平治の總理が如何にも金の問題に關する限り
極めて客觀的な態度を以て居らるゝが、おふりにな
らん、さうして
『どうも平治の金に対する觀念は如何にも客觀
主義を思はれらるゝが、どうか
と云ふお話が内大臣にあった。で、思ひらく陸軍或は
例の楊代等の建議に對して居らるゝではないかと思は
れた。それで總理の話にどうも陸軍大臣は虚偽な、
と云つて、上前の時に自分(總理)は外務省の
西報の三百二十六号は既に「さうであるから
あの範圍であることはあるまい。又諸般の情勢が変
化して陸海軍一致して考へたことならば自分も又
考へ直すけれども今の処はかうしても所謂無條件の
軍事同盟には自分は賛成である」と云ふことを言
つた。又、大張の團、海軍大臣にも言つて居ら
るゝ。さうして「さうであるが、陛下は陸軍省に歸
つてから軍務の團、軍中の人々に總理は始めに賛
成して賛成、下う後で反對して自分を誤した」と云
ふことを故意に言つて居る。四月廿二日に五相會
議をやるとは決して居らるゝ。そして十八日にやること
を定めたのは陸軍の建議に依つて、さうであるが、
總理が「さう」と言つて放逐して居る。今日陸軍
と激突して解れると言ふ事もあるが、何とか好轉
させてから解の度、と言ふ事を總理は自分に話して
居るが、――

Doc 3150-337A

110.5

二六二頁

尚ほ殿下は木戸も召されて松平に対するとおん
なぐやうな言ひを言ひなすべ。さうして
君し此内閣が嫌めたら、近衛はどうだうう」と
云ふお話だつたけれども木戸は「近衛はよくござい
ません」と申上げた。

二六三頁

尚ほ木戸に対して「何か」に方々はなだううかと
云ふことであつて

「此事件、即ち軍事同盟案の問題で内閣が変ると云ふ
ことは困る。」

要するに殿下のお話は、内閣問題の責任は陸軍にまゐ
りなすべしと云ふことであつた。

「御伊勢に於て我両大使を召さることはどうか。又總理が自ら
「もし、ラッリニに會ひに御伊勢に行くことはどうか。」

と云ふお話があった時に、總理が行くことは矢張り國威に
關する、影響が大きいと云ふことを申上げ居る。同時
に變へることも今更な事ない。又總理が行く、行けな
いとはないけれども、行くことそれ自身が問題である。と云ふや
うにお答へて居る。で木戸のお話は、口は「内閣も長くな
りやうと思ふ。廿日には恐らく五相會議は開く。」……

Doc. 3150-337A

No. 6

二六六頁

それから其日に大機に歸つて夕刻東京の新聞社の
ら電報があつて、独ソの間に不可侵條約が結ばれたと云ふ
通知があつた、と云ふことで結局若くこれが事實ならば
要するに日本の今までの日独ソの軍事同盟と云ふことは
自然に解消し、又内政上にもこれで變化が起らざる
と得ないと云ふ情況になつたと思つて居ると、東京から
電話で非常に陸軍は弱つてゐる、内閣も非常に困つて
居るやうだ、と云ふことで、或は上京しろ、と言つて来る向も
あるけれども、あんまり又慌て、彼是ともよくない、何
か慎重にと思つて尚一日様子を見るつもりである。
近衛は輕井沢から伏見宮の御蘇儀の爲に帰
つて来た。それを又政變の近と見る爲に、いろいろ
言ひわらして問題にして居る向もある。

not used

Doc 3150 - 338A

西園寺・原田日記 昭和十四年九月一日 よりの抜萃

二六二頁

廿日の夜、松平は近衛と本戸に會つて翌日葉山に行つて
内大臣に會ひ東京に於ける後継内閣に對しこのことを報
告し内大臣の考慮を求めて自今之處に午後八時頃やつ
来るの語に總理は内大臣に述も今日のやうな狀態では政
治はとれない。で結局此種ソの不可侵條約の成立に依つ
て日本の外交は殆ど捨て身を喰つたやうな狀態である。
之も矢張陸軍の無理がよゝみに外交の失敗である。で自分
は日本独自の臣節の道を通すことは一は以て陸軍に對
して反省を求めると云ふが點を示し他は以て陛下に對し申
譯はいかうお詫をいと許めらる。で兎に角陸軍は今日の
此非常に關にしておろから、後継内閣に就そは發言權はな
いが之を以て陸軍を過剰することは今日の場合面白くない

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 341 - (10 September 1939)

P. 2650

- - - - -

Admiral YONAI said: "As a matter of fact, in the early part of August under the previous Cabinet, the War Minister seemed to have considerable difficulty with the Nomonhan Incident. In brief, he wanted that incident to be settled by diplomatic negotiations. In other words, to open diplomatic negotiations between Japan and Russia to suspend the Nomonhan conflict and agree to end the conflict. As for the way I feel, why didn't he announce it at the Five Ministers' Conference beforehand? There is nothing that can be done when they start it, then bungle it, and then bring it to the Five Ministers' Conference. It was a very distasteful situation to start the incident without mentioning it, and then to bring up the problem after they bungled it. When I asked if it wouldn't be better to carry on until the boundary is restored, the War Minister quietly withdrew. Ultimately, it ended in such a way and it is indeed regrettable."

I.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-341A

Exhibit No.

西園寺公望日記 第三百四十一回
より抜粋

.....
米内大將は「実は、参内閣で八月の初旬に、陸軍大臣
がノモニンで餘程困つてゐる。あの事件をどうも、
外交交渉に終して貰いたい。言葉を変へて言へば
對外交交渉を始め、ノモニンの戦闘を中止し
所謂停戦協定にもつて行つて貰いたい。云ふ話だ
あつたが、自分としては始める前に何故五相會議
で報告しなかつたのか、始めてしくじつてから今に至
る五相會議にかつたのは様子をいじやうなのか、
やる時は黙つてやつて置きてしくじつてからいづて本
と云ふ状態は面白くない。兎に角國境を回復す
るまでやつたら好い、いやなふと言つたら陸軍大臣
はもう、引退つてしまつてを、結局あらうことに
なつて尚ほどうも申訳ない話である。」

IPS Doc. No. 3150-343A

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-FARADA TE OIRS

Chapter 343 - (pages 2678-80)

3 November 1939

On the morning of November 3rd, I returned to Tokyo and on the morning of the 4th, when I called on the Premier at his residence after a long absence, he said: ****

* * * * *

"Recently, Ambassador SHIBATORI returned and said that we must form a Japanese-German-Soviet alliance or strengthen the anti-Comintern axis and oust England and United States."

* * * * *

昭和十四年十一月六日

陸軍々縮ト西園寺公

第三百四十三回ヨリノ抜萃

十一月三日ノ朝、東京ニ出テ、四日ノ朝總理ヲ久
シ振リテ私邸ニ訪オタ處ガ

白鳥大使ガ此ノ間歸ツテ來テ日獨蘇同盟、要スル
ニ防共ノ中軸ヲ強化シテ英米追出シラヤラナケレ
バイカン、ト言フ事ヲ言ツテ居ツタ

Doe. 3150-343A

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
Chapter 370 - (pages 2874-5)

20 July 1940.

When I met Chief Cabinet Secretary ISHIWATA, he said: "ANAMI and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO both came to me and said: 'The present Cabinet must amicably withdraw at any cost. Because the diplomatic relations are already going ahead satisfactorily due to the Four Ministers' Conference and various other connections, we will say nothing more about foreign policy. However, in order to realize KONOYE's new political order, we would like the Cabinet to withdraw.' When I disapproved, the Vice Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau said: 'Then, there is nothing to be done but force the eventual resignation of the War Minister.'" Saying this, they left.

On the afternoon of the same day, a Four Ministers' Conference was held. At that time, the Premier called the War Minister into a separate room and asked: "Are you aware of the circumstances surrounding the visit of the Vice Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to Chief Secretary ISHIWATA urging mass resignation of the Cabinet?" The War Minister declared: "Yes, I know. However, you must take their opinions as their personal opinions." The Premier asked: "Then what do you personally think?" The War Minister replied: "In the long run, I think it best that the Cabinet resign. However, this is still my personal opinion ---" He had added this, but the Premier was saying that it was certainly a queer statement. I heard all this from Navy Minister YOSHIDA.

EXCERPTS FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 373 - (pages 2892-96)

19 August 1940

Furthermore, the following was the result of the Four Ministers' Conference:

A. In order to evolve a policy for the settlement of the China Incident, and also for dealing with the new world situation, the establishment and the strengthening of our war-time economy shall be made the basis of our domestic and foreign policy. For this purpose, the government will assume unitary leadership in all economic activities and strive to the utmost in the promotion thereof, except in cases of absolute necessity for the existence of the operating forces (military) to dispose of or assume leadership themselves.

B. World Policy

1. Corresponding to the sudden changes in the world situation, and in order quickly to establish a New Order for east Asia, we plan to strengthen the axis of Japan, Germany and Italy. The East Asiatic nations must act in concert and carry out various important policies. However, we must decide on the most opportune time in the world situation and not miss it; that is, as it concerns the method of strengthening the Axis and its time for realization.

2. As regards relations with the Soviet Union, a Non-Aggression Pact will be concluded with her by Japan, Manchukuo and Mongolia (length of effectiveness, five to ten years), and in addition to planning the immediate solution of pending questions, we will realize sufficient military preparedness to safeguard against defeat by Soviet Russia during the period of effectiveness of the Non-Aggression Pact.

3. In order to include the English, French, Dutch, and Portuguese colonies in the neighboring islands and the Orient within the substance of the New Order in the Far East, positive arrangements will be undertaken. Moreover, we will endeavor to exclude ourselves from international conference in reference to the above.

4. Even though we will avoid unnecessary collisions with the United States, as long as it concerns the establishment of a New Order in the Far East we are firmly determined to eliminate any interference on her part by actual force, thereby assuring the realization of our policy.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

The above were the items which were discussed by the Premier and the three State Ministers; MATSUOKA, YOSHIDA and TOJO, while the Cabinet was in the process of being organized. These were the fundamental policies for organizing the new Cabinet.

At the liaison meeting between the Imperial General Headquarters and the government during July, the points presented by the Imperial General Headquarters on the solution of the situation consistent with the transition of world affairs, were as set forth in the policies as follows:

The Empire, faced with the changed state of world affairs, will improve its foreign situation, accelerating the settlement of the China Incident, and together with this, it will seize the most opportune time to solve the problem of the Southern region. In case the settlement of the China Incident cannot be made as yet, the changing of our attitude by laying stress on our Southern region policy shall be decided taking into consideration the various domestic and foreign situations. The various preparations necessary for coping with the above two items will be given the utmost acceleration.

THE ESSENTIAL POINTS

Article I

In regard to the disposition of the China Incident, we will concentrate our collective strength on political and military strategy. We will especially exterminate acts of assistance by a third nation and will plan the prompt submission of the Chungking Regime by exerting all our efforts. Regarding the South Seas Islands policy, we will endeavor for its furtherance by seizing a good opportunity and utilizing the changes in the situation.

Article II

In regard to foreign policy, the objective will be to accelerate the disposition of the China Incident and to seek the solution of the South Seas Islands problem. For the most part, it will be as set forth in the following:

1. First, emphasis is to be placed on the policies towards Germany, Italy, and Russia, especially to immediately strengthen the political solidarity with Germany and Italy, and to plan on making far-reaching adjustments in our relations with Russia.

2. Toward the United States, we will maintain impartial claims and a solemn attitude. Although we will not refrain from boldly carrying out the policy deemed necessary by the Empire in spite of the inevitable and natural aggravation which will accompany it, we will always heed the actions of the United States. We must plan, even by going out of our way, to avoid the increase of friction.

3. Regarding French Indo-China and Hongkong, the following will apply:

a. Regarding French Indo-China (Kwangchow Bay included), we shall expect the complete cessation of acts of assistance to CHIANG Kai-shek, and together with this, they must supply our troops, permit the use of airfields and the passage of troops. They will also strive for the acquisition of raw materials necessary to the Empire.

b. In regard to Hongkong, hand in hand with the absolute cutting-off of the CHIANG-aid route in Burma, we must at once drive strongly ahead on various schemes for the purpose of exterminating enemy sympathizers.

c. In regard to the concessions, together with planning the extermination of enemy sympathizers, and the withdrawal of troops of belligerent countries, we will induce China to gradually take these back.

4. In regard to the Dutch East Indies, we will for the time being endeavor to secure vital resources through diplomatic measures.

5. In view of their strategic importance to our national defense, we will, if at all possible, take measures to secure the return of the former German and French territorial islands in the South Pacific through diplomatic negotiations.

6. In regard to other countries in the South Seas, we will plan through friendly negotiations to have them cooperate with our policy.

Article III

In regard to guidance within the nation, while organizing and guiding the various governmental agencies necessary to carry out the above mentioned plans, we will accelerate the completion of a defensive nation which will be able to cope with any world situation. For this purpose we will endeavor to realize the following items:

1. The realization of a powerful political structure.
2. A comprehensive movement for a general mobilization law.
3. The establishment of war-time economy.
4. The accumulation of war materials and the increase of shipping tonnage. (Putting into effect maximum advance imports, special imports, and regulations regarding consumption.)
5. Adjustments in the expansion of production as well in the regulation of armaments.
6. The lifting of the national spirit and the unification of public opinion.

The above are the particulars of our policy for coping with the present situation decided upon by the Supreme Command and the Government at the Imperial General Headquarters. Because of its supreme importance, I was told when it was handed to me to show it only to the Premier and the Genro.

2. Toward the United States, we will maintain impartial claims and a solemn attitude. Although we will not refrain from boldly carrying out the policy deemed necessary by the Empire in spite of the inevitable and natural aggravation which will accompany it, we will always heed the actions of the United States. We must plan, even by going out of our way, to avoid the increase of friction.

3. Regarding French Indo-China and Hongkong, the following will apply:

a. Regarding French Indo-China (Kwangchow Bay included), we shall expect the complete cessation of acts of assistance to CHIANG Kai-shek, and together with this, they must supply our troops, permit the use of airfields and the passage of troops. They will also strive for the acquisition of raw materials necessary to the Empire.

b. In regard to Hongkong, hand in hand with the absolute cutting-off of the CHIANG-aid route in Burma, we must at once drive strongly ahead on various schemes for the purpose of exterminating enemy sympathizers.

c. In regard to the concessions, together with planning the extermination of enemy sympathizers, and the withdrawal of troops of belligerent countries, we will induce China to gradually take these back.

4. In regard to the Dutch East Indies, we will for the time being endeavor to secure vital resources through diplomatic measures.

5. In view of their strategic importance to our national defense, we will, if at all possible, take measures to secure the return of the former German and French territorial islands in the South Pacific through diplomatic negotiations.

6. In regard to other countries in the South Seas, we will plan through friendly negotiations to have them cooperate with our policy.

Article III

In regard to guidance within the nation, while organizing and guiding the various governmental agencies necessary to carry out the above mentioned plans, we will accelerate the completion of a defensive nation which will be able to cope with any world situation. For this purpose we will endeavor to realize the following items:

1. The realization of a powerful political structure.
2. A comprehensive movement for a general mobilization law.
3. The establishment of war-time economy.
4. The accumulation of war materials and the increase of shipping tonnage. (Putting into effect maximum advance imports, special imports, and regulations regarding consumption.)
5. Adjustments in the expansion of production as well in the production of armaments.
6. The lifting of the national spirit and the unification of public opinion.

The above are the particulars of our policy for coping with the present situation decided upon by the Supreme Command and the Government at the Imperial General Headquarters. Because of its supreme importance, I was told when it was handed to me to show it only to the Premier and the Genro.

I.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-370B

Exhibit No.

西園寺原田日記

第三百七十四「のり」の抜萃

尚石渡書記官長に會ふ。西園寺、武藤軍務局長二人で自分の處に来て、「どうしても現内閣は圓滿に退さ責むたい。要するに外交は既に四相會議とびつゝな連絡で非常に巧く行つてゐるから、外交のことはもう言はなければ、要するに近衛新体制を現実にするおに引退を貰ひたい」と云ふやうなことを言つて居つた。自分は之を拒否した。然、次官、軍務局長はそれなら総内閣を辭してもう道々云々と言つて置て歸る行つた。

其日の午後、四相會議があつて、其時に總理は陸軍大臣を別室に呼んで、「石渡書記官長の處に次官や軍務局長が来て、内閣の總辭職を奨めたが、その事柄に就ては君は知つてゐるのか」と言つた。處が「自分も知つて居る。然、彼等の意見は、彼等の私的意見と見てくれ」と言つて居つた。で、「然、君自身はどう思ふのか」と言つて聞かれた。處が「自分も結局内閣が辭められ方が好いと思ふ。然、之は天張り自分の私的意見であるから……」と云ふことを附加して居るが、如何にも訝しな話である。と總理も言つて居ると云ふことを自分は吉田陸軍大臣から聞いた。

EXCERPTS FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS, COVERING
THE 1 SEPTEMBER 1940 ENTRY, on Pages 2921-23 thereof.Page 2921-2923

I met Captain TAKAGI again on the train and heard from him of the conversation between Military Affairs Bureau Chief MUTO and Captain TAKAGI which took place at the meeting of the Preparations Committee. (TAKAGI related the following) "According to MUTO's story, the leading element of the New Organization regardless of its title, is actually a political association of political parties. Therefore, MUTO said it was not desirable that the Army participate in such a thing which possesses such characteristics. However, the arguments have changed at this time, and when practical applications are considered, it is necessary to delegate strong political powers to the nucleus of the New Organization. In order to do this, it is necessary to appoint party members. The opinions of a great number of other directors are that this new organization is one in which the military, the government authorities, and people must unite in order to construct a country with powerful national defense as clearly contained in the proclamation of the Premier. It is not like the politics of former times when there were various disagreements concerning theoretical policies, and which were struggles for selfish interests. This includes former politics, economy, education, and all other aspects of national life. Not only this, but this present movement is not one which arose from the masses. Rather than that, the actual situation is such that the Military and the Government authorities must do the leading and spread the movement. From these viewpoints, the nucleus of the new organization is not appropriate. Also the fact that the Army and Navy would withdraw does not signify that this new movement will succeed. On the contrary, there is a fear that this movement will be rendered impotent thereby. Thus, in this manner, the other directors, were all in agreement with my proposal. These are all superficial reasons and the inner purposes of the Army's contentions must be clarified. The Army had been exerting all its efforts to induce the dissolution of already existing political parties. The Sokushin Doshikai /T.N. Promotion Association/ which had been dissolved however, does not have much of a voice in the Preparations Committee. As a result, they have become very fidgety and uneasy. On the other hand, the Army

planned to unite the political parties into one unit and to create a so-called 'Pro-Army Party' /T.N. Shingunto./ They planned to lead them along according to their own wishes. Their plan received a blow when Premier KONOYE's proclamation was published in the papers. KONOYE got the jump on the Army, whereas they had planned to utilize him as a robot."

Excerpts from SAIONJI-KADA MEMOIRS, Covering
The 1 September 1940 Entry, on Pages 2914-17 Thereof

2914-2917

I proceeded to KONOYE's residence and heard about various matters from him from two to four o'clock. KONOYE said: "It was very good that the current trip of Gen. KOISO was cancelled. However, KOISO's attitude is very suspicious. There are numerous mysterious aspects concerning the attitude of Military Affairs Bureau Chief MUTO. I concluded that this was an all out effort to bring about the downfall of the Cabinet. To begin with, it was MATSUOKA who recommended Gen. KOISO, and when MATSUOKA met KOISO for the first time, MATSUOKA showed him his writings concerning his diplomatic policies and his own opinions. He also made various verbal explanations and Gen. KOISO expressed complete approval of everything at that time. Therefore, MATSUOKA requested that KOISO go to the Dutch East Indies. After this request was made of him, KOISO suddenly injected his stipulations. The results were such as we have now, and KOISO's attitude is very queer. The Army and Navy are keenly desirous of deciding on an immediate successor, now that KOISO has quit. As a result, I decided to despatch Minister of Commerce and Industry KOBAYASHI. Concerning the current proclamation of the New Organization, the Ministers and Vice Ministers are already familiar with the contents of this proclamation. I wrote strongly that this was neither Nazism nor Fascism, but Chief of Military Affairs Bureau MUTO deleted all of this and returned it to the Cabinet. I had the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet rewrite this to conform to the original manuscript and instructed him to thrust it back to the Army again. All of MUTO's actions are very suspicious." KONOYE continued in an anxious tone: "Looking at such happenings, I wonder if this Cabinet won't fall in about ten months."

Concerning INUKAI, KONOYE said: "He is like a puppet of Col. IWAKURO of the Army. It seems that he was reporting everything by telephone to him from here. During the formation of the cabinet, the men said to be close to me were conversing noisily in the dining room. I thought they were noisy. Then I spotted INUKAI, SAIONJI, Kinjehi, USHIBA and MATSUMOTO there. I had made various telephone calls from my office in order to give ministerial posts to people whom they disapproved, and when they discovered this, they were very dissatisfied and had gathered together to noisily discuss this. INUKAI reported each happening to IWAKURO by telephone and he was a big nuisance. Since they were becoming too noisy, I went into the dining room and told them: 'Why are all of you gathered here anyway? Didn't you tell me repeatedly to execute things by myself because matters would not be settled if there were too many discussions? I also had that in mind so I just made telephone calls to various places from my office and carried out the necessary work. It is

too selfish of you to expect me to discuss matters only with yourselves without conferring with others and to raise a howl of protest when men not to your liking come. It is my own business whether I confer with you or not. If you're going to raise such a disturbance around here -- please go home.' I rebuked them fiercely. They became silent then, and didn't utter a word. A little while later, SAIOJI Kinkazu and INUAI made up a roster of the cabinet members and saying that this was just a mere suggestion, they brought it to me. According to it, MATSUMOTO Joji was the Foreign Minister and INUAI Ken was the Minister of Communications. I was thoroughly disgusted with them. During the first OKUYE Cabinet, I had a slight tendency to inflate their ego, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary had confided ever thing to them.

1.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-374B

22

云小なり、また他の諸事は、主計自らの家へ渡す。以上は表面の理由で、陸軍が主張の門閥の理由が明解しなげなばかりで、陸軍は陰に陽に既成政黨、解消を促進し、從通し、心解消し、促進同志会ありは新準備会に対しても、人々を驚き、地位を奪得し、居る。此も彼等は非常に焦躁不安反成行と云ふ。一方、陸軍は政黨をうつて一見して、所謂親軍愛を無効し、之を以て陸軍の衰へるに引摺つて行かう。さうな訂意だ。其處に、近衛總理の新聞に於ける認解に依り、先づその一語を犯し、之を、近衛は、近衛を、本質に持つてゐた處が、すつかり見えて打たれた。

©

Exhibit No.

……二時頃より三時頃まで近衛の処に行き、いふ／＼話
聞、近衛の今度、大機大略に行、いふとやうな事は
大変な事なわけだし、今度、大機大略の方には、いふ餘程
訝し。殊に陸軍、武藤軍務局長の態度、いふと
不可思議な事、非常に多い。徹頭徹尾、倒閣の運動
にと同分は見、抑、大機大略と推薦、いふのは、松岡
にせよ、三井、初に松岡が、大機に合、い、時、に、國、外
交政策も書いたもの、及び、國、外、の意見も附、き、書、き、
い、も、國、外、に、言、葉、で、い、う、い、う、い、う、い、う、い、う、い、う、
將、は、い、う、時、は、い、う、に、就、て、同、意、の、意、を、表、し、た、て、あ、
る、が、松、岡、は、大、機、に、關、連、の、度、に、行、く、と、い、う、
大、機、に、關、連、の、度、に、行、く、と、い、う、に、條、件、を、お、し、い、
度、の、や、う、な、に、な、つ、た、が、い、う、と、い、う、に、大、機、に、關、連、
は、訝、し、い、で、大、機、を、や、め、た、上、は、開、議、を、入、り、な、
に、即、刻、代、り、を、決、め、な、け、な、い、と、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、
から、頻、りに、言、い、な、さ、る、が、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、
商、工、大、臣、を、特、派、す、と、い、う、に、決、し、た、が、い、う、と、い、う、
の、新、本、制、の、声、明、に、就、て、大、臣、や、次、長、が、既、に、承、知、
て、お、り、た、声、明、の、内、容、に、就、て、十、千、ス、又、は、十、千、ス、
た、い、と、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、
は、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、
書、記、官、長、に、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、と、い、う、

Doc. No. 3150-375-A

Exh. No. 3810 4

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 375 - (pages 2929-30)

About 5 Sept 1940

The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal told the Emperor,
"It is, of course, permissible for your Majesty to instruct
the administration as to the outline of the foreign policy,
etc.; however, it is not desirable that criticisms of per-
sonnel be made. In this respect, there is, of course, a
difference between the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the
Imperial Household Minister....."

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc. 3150-375A

9

西園寺——原田日記 第三百七十五回りの抜粋。

内大臣は陛下に「外交の大綱とか何とかに就ての仰
指示は、當然政府に達してしまふはなけり。然し、苟
り人事に就て餘り彼是仰有ることは面合はし」と云ふ
ことも申上つてある。それに就て、内大臣と宮内大臣の
間に違ふは無論ある……

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 378 - (pages 2977-80)

20 October 1940

..... Next, I explained the circumstances under which the recent Tri-Partite Pact was concluded. I still have my doubts as to how the then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Prime Minister explained the matter to His Majesty. SAIONJI is also greatly doubtful as to how they explained the matter and obtained the Imperial sanction, for His Majesty had been absolutely against it and had always been saying that he would never give his consent.

And, the outline of the matter which I understand from what KIDO and KONOYE explained to me was that in short, the Navy agreed to it and that finally both the Foreign and the Prime Ministers also explained to His Majesty more or less in the line that there was no other step to take towards the U.S.A. and the only measure to keep the U.S.A. out of war was the conclusion of a Japanese-German-Italian Military Alliance. However, when we think of His Majesty's august wish and the particulars up to the present, Prince SAIONJI feels that he has no excuse to make. And furthermore, when we consider His Majesty's innermost feelings, we are filled with an almost unbearable feeling of trepidation. As to the above matter, Minister of the Imperial Household MATSUDAIRA said, sometime ago, "Although I do not directly intervene in political affairs, every time I go into His Majesty's presence, His Majesty showed indefinable regret," and showed deep sympathy for His Majesty.

As to the conclusion of the recent Tri-Partite Pact, Prince SAIONJI was kept in complete ignorance and it came as a complete surprise. As for me, I heard from naval sources that there was going to be a September Imperial Headquarters Liaison Conference on the very day it was going to be held. I telephoned KONOYE from Osaka around eight o'clock in the evening. KONOYE answered through the phone that 'he had just returned home from the Liaison Conference, it having just ended. The Navy had finally consented and now the agreement could be concluded.' The following day I met KONOYE and heard the general circumstances from him, but the most important point of how they were able to obtain the Imperial sanction was not mentioned. Then I spoke to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and asked, "Why did you not tell us beforehand? If there was something wrong with the GENRO, such as his being dull, or ill, or lacking sense, it would be unnecessary to tell anything. However, under the present situation, it is very regrettable that not a word was said to the GENRO on such an important problem and which directly concerns the fate of our country." To this, KIDO replied, "I felt too sorry for Prince SAIONJI so I did not tell him." I admonished KIDO rather severely, saying, "This is a problem above such private sentiments. Actual facts are facts. However opposed he might be to it, or however sorry you might feel for him, you must report all that you have to. That is your duty towards His Majesty." KIDO said that "henceforth he would report all that he could" and that was all we said about the matter.

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 378

(20 October 1940) pp 2974-7

Safeguarding of Saionji-Harada Memoirs

.....On that same day, I went to Okitsu and reported to Prince SAIONJI/ on the latest happenings since I last saw him. I consulted the Prince about requesting Prince TAMAMATSU to keep the transcriptions /manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA memoirs/ in the care of his Highness until they were delivered into the hands of the Emperor. Prince SAIONJI agreed to this and said: "If His Highness/Prince TAMAMATSU/ doesn't mind, I believe that would be a very splendid arrangement."

On the 19th, I returned to my home in Ciso. On the morning of the 20th, because /I learned that/ His Highness /Prince TAMAMATSU, a Navy officer/ had returned to his palace from his ship, I called him on the telephone and talked with His Highness personally over the phone. His Highness said: "Come at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon." I went to the Takahawa Palace /of Prince TAMAMATSU at the appointed time/. I told His Highness: "This record /manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA memoirs/ was started in 1929. The following is the reason why this was undertaken: At the time of the London Treaty/when it was a major political issue/ only false rumors about the issue prevailed; and the truth about the matter was never known /to the public/. Especially, the attitude taken by the Emperor has been, for the most part, falsely rumored. Moreover, the counsel given to the Throne and actions taken by the Genro /Prince SAIONJI/, court officials close to the Emperor, and the Cabinet Ministers on the whole, have been falsely rumored. As a direct result, this created serious perturbations in the political circles; and this was the direct cause of subsequent disturbances in the Army and Navy. The virtues and intelligent perspicacity of the Emperor were perverted almost beyond imagination by propaganda. I felt that this was an exceedingly regrettable fact. Since I /HARADA/ knew, in my capacity /as Prince SAIONJI's secretary/ the truth of the matter, I felt that there was a necessity for recording this in written form for posterity. Therefore, I consulted KONOYE, we decided to seek the assistance of /Viscountess KONOYE Yasuko/ the wife of /Viscount KONOYE/ Hidemaro, the younger brother of Prince KONOYE, and have her take it down/as I dictate it/ and thus preserve it for posterity. It has now grown to 10,000 odd pages.

"This is the way in which these memoirs are being made. Every week, I go to see Prince SAIONJI and make a report to him; my memorandum for this report is used as the basic material and I have it taken down and kept. I then take the transcribed manuscript of the notes to SAIONJI; he reads the material personally, corrects mistakes, and adds whatever additional notes he deems necessary to the manuscript. He returns it to me the next time I go to see him. A clean copy of this is made; this is then edited and filed away.

"Nowadays, this/the fact the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs is being compiled/ has occasionally appeared in the newspapers; moreover, even the fact that this /manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs/ is deposited for protective custody in the Sumitomo Trust Co. has become known to the public. I have heard there is danger that a faction of the rightists might, under certain circumstances, destroy it/manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs/. Therefore, I have consulted Prince SAIONJI about this matter and have decided to request Your Highness to keep it in Your Highness personal custody until it is completed. When it is completed, the original manuscript which has Prince SAIONJI's corrections and revisions on it will be presented to the Emperor in its original form. The edited copy will be printed and published at a suitable occasion. I think it won't be possible, in all probability, to publish the document until after 10 or 15 years have elapsed from the death of Prince SAIONJI. At any rate, the future custody of it is entrusted to MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal. I would like to have Your Highness consult MATSUDAIRA and make thorough arrangements so that he will be able to keep in close touch with Your Highness' steward /for preserving the manuscript in Your Highness' custody/."

His Highness /Prince TAKAMATSU/ said: "I gladly give consent. I shall give thorough instructions about the matter to YAMAMUCHI, the steward: make suitable arrangements (in regards to the manuscript) with him." I thanked His Highness for this and changed the topic of our discussion.

I. P. S. Dec 16. 3150-378B

に依つて速記綴て思ふに貴く、大抵上つたものを西園寺の地
に持て寄附して、西園寺が直接見を上同達つた地を訂正し、筆
の足りない地を入れて、その概全を呈進して置くんではないです。
それと又書書して、尚ほ、一、二、三、と書くことゝなつて、現在に
於ては、それが多少新築な地にもなり、一、住及の信託会社
の保護預りになつてゐることも、一、世間一般に、右
翼の部、一、或る場合には、一、後継、一、とする危険も、一、と
いふまでもない。その、一、西園寺に相譲を致して、一、して完成するま
で、殿下の所、一、西園寺に相譲して、一、完成した後は、西園寺
の加筆、一、一、は、現物、一、一、殿下の所、一、一、は、一、一、
一、一、は、一、一、は、一、一、は、一、一、は、一、一、は、一、一、
百年の後、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、
一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、
頼んで居る、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、
下の地、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、
かうよく御用、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、
一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、
一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、

と云ふ、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、
一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、一、

DOC. No. 3150-14B

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 14 - (pages 112-3)

8 October, 1931.

In the evening when I saw the Premier again, he told me, "Up to now I have told all the Cabinet Members, 'It is not desirable for the Army to be connected with the founding of an independent Government in Manchuria'. All the Cabinet members agreed with me but, calling the War Minister last of all I told him, 'The Present is a time /for the Army/ to look on quietly. As the Government has previously stated to the world that she has absolutely no territorial ambitions in the establishment of an independent Government in Manchuria. Since such a statement has been made therefore, to have any connection at all with the establishment of an independent Government, because it would mean a going back /on this statement/, won't do at all. In the first place, not only is it a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, but also if it is done, the whole world will become our enemy. In view of the present economic situation we would be forced to become isolated. So, as Japan's position will be endangered, at all costs Japan must act within treaty limitations and whatever is made independent, at all events the negotiations must be made in partnership with the Central Government". I explained this to the War Minister, but he said: "Then won't the situation be the same as before the incident?" and then left with the words, "Let me think it over for a day or two".

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

O.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-14B

Exhibit.

昭和二年十月十日

西園寺原田日記

第十四回、よりの抜萃

夫から自分は又總理に刻達して見ると「自分は今迄各閣僚に向て『滿洲に獨立政府を樹てるやうなことに陸軍は關係するとは面白くない』と云ふことを言つた處が以て他の閣僚は同感であつたが最後に陸軍大臣を呼んで『先づ今日は静視す可き狀である。』

で滿洲に獨立政府を造ることは豫て政府が中外に聲明しなやうに決し、領土的野心がないと云ふことを言つて居る。にも拘らず之を裏切るやうなことになるから獨立政府を造るには少しも關係しなはならぬ。第一九箇國條約に反するのみならず、さうなれば世界を敵とすることになる。今日經濟界の状況から見ても強て孤立とならなければならぬ。で日本の地位を危きに導くものであるからどうも日本としては條約の範圍内に於てやらなければならぬ。如何なるものが獨立し、もては角交渉は中央政府を相手にと交渉しなければならぬ』と云ふことを陸軍大臣に説いたが陸軍大臣は『そんなら善く考慮と同様になるにやないか』と言つて居る中に『まあ一兩日考へて貰ひたい』と云ふので陸軍大臣は歸る行つた。』

O.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-14B

Exhibit.

昭和二年十月十日

西園寺、原田日記

第十四回、よりの抜萃

夫から自分は又總理に刻達する見ると「自分は今迄各閣僚に向て『滿洲に獨立政府を樹てるやうなことに陸軍は關係するとは面白くない』と云ふことを言つた處が比喩他、閣僚は同感であつたが最後に陸軍大臣を呼んで『先づ今日は静視す可き紋である。』

で滿洲に獨立政府を造ることは豫て政府が中外に聲明しなやうに決し、領土的野心がないと云ふことを言つて居る。にも拘らず之を裏切るやうなことになるから獨立政府を造るには少しも關係しはならぬ。第一九箇國條約に反するのみならず、さうなれば世界を敵とすることになる。今日經濟界の状況から見ても強て孤立とならなければならぬ。で日本の地位を危きに導くものであるからどうも日本としては條約の範圍内に於てやらなければならぬ。如何なるものが獨立し、も更に外交交渉は中央政府を相手にも交渉しなければならぬ』と云ふことを陸軍大臣に説いたが陸軍大臣は『そんなら善、善哉、善哉と同様になるにやないか』と言つて居る中に『まあ一兩日考へて貰ひたい』と云ふので陸軍大臣は歸る行つた。